The following is excerpted from the interview by Frank Y. Nakamura, 17 April 1950 of former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Koichi (at the time still in Sagamo Prison), from pages 442-443 of Kido's diary for the period of the Tokyo war crimes trial and his imprisonment (木戸紘一日記　東京裁判機　ISBN 978-4-13-030043-8). Note that this is distinct from the frequently-referenced wartime "Kido Diary" translated for the trial itself. The original Japanese text follows the translation.

Question 4

According to some American writers, around May 1945 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew and others were advocating that the United States should declare a willingness to allow the Japanese imperial system to continue inn order to facilitate an end to the Pacific War. Had the U.S. made such a declaration around the first of May, how much do you think it would have aided your efforts to end the war?

Answer

Even had such a declaration had been made then, whether it would have hastened the end of the war or conversely might even have hindered it is impossible to judge.

At that time, the air raids on the homeland were just getting underway, and the situation in Okinawa didn't yet seem hopeless. To the contrary, it was purported that the enemy was suffering significant losses. I fear that if the United States had issued such a declaration with the intent of promoting peace at that stage, it would have given the proponents of continued war a significant boost.

Those advocating for continued war would likely have argued: "The U.S. suffered significant casualties at Iwo Jima, and now faces even greater losses in Okinawa. They must have realized that a decisive battle on the mainland would be a disaster. Clearly, the U.S. has its weaknesses and is now eager for an end to the war. Japan is not the only one suffering; the final outcome will be decided in the last moments…"

Back then, the signs of defeat were not yet clear in the general perception, and such arguments would have likely prevailed. Although the Suzuki Cabinet was being formed and preparing for peace, it was also a time when advocates for peace were being actively arrested. The positions of those like myself who were seen as peace advocates had become quite unstable. As I mentioned earlier, there was even an incident on June 18 when War Minister Anami brought up the idea of my dismissal, showing that I was under scrutiny. If such a declaration from the U.S. had temporarily strengthened the position of those advocating continued war, they might have purged the peace faction. For instance, I might have been ousted as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, replaced with a proponent of continued war. There could have been a Similar purge across the entire political leadership.

Considering Japan’s delicate domestic situation at the time, if the U.S. had issued such a declaration with skill, it might indeed have helped. But done poorly it could have uprooted the budding peace movement before it had a chance to grow. By the time of the Potsdam Declaration, the situation had progressed significantly. The signs of defeat were clear to the public, and arguments dismissing the declaration as a sign of enemy weakness no longer held weight. Moreover, the groundwork for the maneuverings to prepare for peace was solidly in place.

[Translation based on draft from chatGPT, checked and refined by author]

問四 米国側出版物に依れぱ、 一九四五年五月頃陸軍長官スチムソン氏や国務次官グルー氏等は日本に天皇制の存続を許すことを宜言し、 之に依つて太平洋戦争の終結を促進すべきであると主張したそうであるが、 仮に五月一日頃右趣旨の宣言がアメリカによつてなされたとした、 貴下等の終戦工作にはどの程度の寄与がなされたと思ふか。

答 そのような宣言がその時機にあつたとしても、果してそれが終戦を促進することになつたか 又は逆に妨害することになつたかは一概には断定出来ないと思ふ。

当時は本土に対する敵空襲も緒についたばかりであり、沖縄の戦局も未だ絶望と云うわけではなく、 却つて敵軍に大いに出血を強要して居ると称する段階にあつた。そんな時に 終戦促進を目的とするような宣言をアメリカ側が行うのを見たら、 主戦論が大いに勢を得る心配がある。其等の論者は必ずや 「アメリカは硫黄島で多大の出血を余儀なくされた。今又沖縄でも甚大な犠牲を出して居る。 此の分では本土決戦など敢行しては大変なことになると考えるに至つたに違いない。 兎に角アメリカにも弱点はあるのだ。 それで終戦をあせりだしたのだ。 苦しいのは日本ばかりではない。 勝敗は最後の五分間に於て決するのだ……」と云うような主張を展開するに違いない。 一般的には未だ敗戦の兆がはつきりと認められなかつた時期のことであるから、 そんな強い議論が勝つて了う。当時は鈴木内閣が組閣されて和平え〔ママ〕の陣容も整いかけた頃であつたが、 一方に於て和平論者の検挙が盛んに行はれた時機でもあつた。私の如く和平論者と見られて居たものにとつては、 その地位も相当不安定となつた時機であつた。前述のように現に 六月十八日に阿南陸相が私の交迭〔ママ：更迭？〕の話を持ち出して来た事実もあつたように、 私は目をつけられて居た。それで継戦論者の立場を一時的にも強くする様な刺戟を与えると、 彼等は和平派の粛清をやつたかも知れない。例えば私は内大臣を追出されて継戦論者が私に替る、 そして同様のことが政治指導層全面に行はれたかも知れない。

以上のような機微な日本の国内事情を考へてアメりカ側が巧みにそのような宣言をやつてくれれば 勿論役に立つたであらうが、 下手をすれば却つて折角芽を吹きかけた和乎論を双葉にしてむしりとらせる結果を招いた かも知れない。 ポツダム宣言の頃となると戦局も随分進んで居た。 敗戦の兆が一般国民の目にもはつきり映つて居るから、あの宣言を以て敵側の弱音だなどと云つても 通用しなくなつた。そ れに和平え〔ママ：へ？〕の準備工作も基礎が相当固つて居た。