TOP SECRET U.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY: NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE

    TURKISH AMBASSADOR, PARIS, REPORTS INTERVIEWS.

                                No: ULTRA/ZIP/BJ 148798
                                Date: 25th August, 1945
    From: Turkish Ambassador, PARIS.
    To: Foreign Ministry, ANGORA.
    No: 217.
    Date: 14th August, 1945.
        [Cable: I A].
    Most Secret.

    It is worth while dwelling on the course
of events since the publication of the POTSDAM
Communique, especially from a psychological point
of view.  The last 7 or 8 days, although containing
[? varied] events, may be called the Atomic Bomb Era.
The ideas, opinions and plans of 9 days ago have
collapsed like an improvised building without
foundations, and the explosion at HIROSHIMA has
demolished the very conceptions of measurement.
A change has been wrought in the standards of power,
resistance, and particularly [? warfare], such as a
century of natural evolution could not achieve.
From here I have tried to gain a true insight into
the spiritual crisis through which Western Europe is
passing [2 groups]. For the last 10 days I have
been in close contact with people whom I considered
useful for this purpose, and I now submit to
Your Excellency the results of my [? efforts] and
impressions.

    1.  I have been anxiously asking myself
whether the results of the POTSDAM Conference were
in fact as meagre as would appear from the
communique.  The Conference sought an agreement

                                         which

Director-General (2).
F.0.(3).
Admiralty
War Office (4).
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry.
Mr. Marsden-Smedley.
Sir E.Bridges.

    

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which would provide a basis for future
cooperation.  Were [1 group] problems which the
Conference discussed, but did not solve, all made
public, or were there a number of secret
understandings not mentioned in the communique?
I discussed the answers to those questions with
many people here, some of whom were present at
POTSDAM, and, after I had established what seemed
to be the closest approximation to the truth,
President TRUMAN’S speech confirmed the reports
I had received, namely, that everything was
discussed there, but nothing was solved.  Apart
from this fact, the most significant thing, to my
mind, was the serenity and calm visible in
Anglo-Amorican circles — a calm which I have never
observed before — why were the Americans and
especially the British not gravely worried by a
situation as dangerous as this, when, the differences
with RUSSIA had not been resolved, and the
’status quo’ had only been held secure with
cotton-thread?	The answer to this question was
given by the Atomic Bomb.

    2.  By a fortunate coincidence, a dinner-party
to which I had invited several foreign friends, and
which was attended by the British, American, Belgian
and Dutch Ambassadors, by a Director-General of the
Swiss Foreign Ministry with the rank of Minister,
and several other foreign friends, fell on
9th August, the day when the excitement of the
Soviet declaration of war was enhanced by the news
of the Atomic Bomb.  After dinner I had separate
talks with the Ambassadors.  Everybody seemed to
want to talk.  This great discovery of Nature’s
secret had loosened their tongues and banished
reserve.  I asked the American Ambassador, who, as
you know, was invited to POTSDAM, whether there had
been any discussion of the Bomb there.  He said it
had been discussed between whiles, but they
themselves had not believed the assurances that
were given.  You will have proof on Friday or
Saturday, they had been told, but when Friday and
Saturday passed without anything happening, they
disbelieved the report, although it came from
the highest quarters.  On Sunday HIROSHIMA was
destroyed.  No information on the subject was given
to the Russians at POTSDAM.  I asked the Ambassador
whether the Russian declaration of war was the
result of a decision at POTSDAM. "The Russians

                                            had


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had agreed to enter the war in principle,” he
replied, "but they did not indicate any definite
time”.	His face broke into a smile as he said,
"The effects of the Atomic Bomb were very rapid
and very far-reaching”. I told the Ambassador
that I had seen a Tass Agency correspondent here
called NERINGÜN [Turkish phonetics] last Thursday,
and he had said "It was an unfriendly act on the
part of the Anglo-Americans to use this invention
in a theatre of war without giving us any
information". I saw with ——— astonishment that
the Ambassador laughed for perhaps five minutes
without stopping when I told him this, and that he
did not consider it necessary to restrain himself.
We agreed that the 'unfriendly act' was not the use
of the discovery, but the discovery itself.

        My Belgian and Dutch friends, and 4 or 5
Ambassadors and Ministers who have been to see me
for a talk during the week, all spoke as if they
had a weight off their minds, and seemed greatly
reassured.  Hitherto they never mentioned the
great dangers in the disruption of the European
balance of power, but now they referred to the
period which has just passed in the gloomiest terms.
The American and British Ambassadors declare quite
openly that the scales have suddenly tilted towards
the left.

        The British Ambassador did not seem so
easy in his mind as the American Ambassador.  The
implications of the bomb have frightened the
British.  They possess the secret, but regard any new
weapon for which they have no antidote as a ———
to the security of the British Isles.  Consequently,
this extraordinary event does not seem a happy
augury to them.  I had already received this
impression from the British press, and it was
confirmed in a discussion with a British friend.
He was stating his views on several points without
any hesitation, but as soon as the Bomb was
mentioned, his expression because immobile.
Hitherto the British have anxiously looked
eastwards from their islands, but this new invention,
by adding many ———s to AMERICA’S gigantic potential,
has now obliged them, in spite of Anglo-American
cooperation, to look westwards with even greater
anxiety.


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    3.  Yesterday I called on the Foreign Minister.
Our conversation was longer than ever before, and
touched on every topic.  I should like to point
out that M. BIDAULT thinks this new invention has
turned world politics upside-down in the twinkling
of an eye.  He is convinced that the Russians
entered the war under its influence.  He thinks
that the [? strategy] and the means and elements
of the [? warfare] of tomorrow will in no way
resemble those of yesterday, and that the
superiority of the Soviets, whose weight was
stifling EUROPE, has certainly lost its ———.
From the way he spoke, I realised that his mind
was dominated by the hope that this sudden alteration
in relative power will enable FRANCE to speak with
as much authority as RUSSIA at least.

        The Foreign Minister first of all explained
to me the problems affecting FRANCE.  The French
are pleased at being invited to enter the Council of
Foreign Ministers and thus help to draw up the
Peace Treaties and solve the questions in dispute.
However, in response to the decision that they
should be regarded as signatories of the Italian
Armistice, they have stated that they are not
prepared to act as though they had signed a
document, which in fact they have not signed, and
that they will participate in the drawing up of a
peace treaty with ITALY only in the capacity of a
Great Power.  He confirmed that no decision had
been taken at POTSDAM, and added that FRANCE, who
will obtain equal legal rights, will do her best
to be an influence, especially in the European Order.
He considered President TRUMAN'S speech excessively
overbearing, especially in the last part. ”We are
confronted with a new Napoleon-ism”, he said.
”The really annoying thing, however, is not that,
but the president’s allusion to bases”. I asked
for information about this.  He said he knew
nothing so far, but according to the SAN FRANCISCO
decisions, the question of bases was necessarily
bound up with collective security.  I reminded him
that TRUMAN had referred to AMERICA'S position and
demanded the bases for AMERICA.  I asked: ”As he
speaks of 'retaining existing bases’, does this
not include places already being [? used]?”. "The
Americans certainly look after the installations
they have built in North AFRICA like their own
off-spring”, the Minister answered half-jokingly,

                                           and

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"and they will be very averse to parting with their
precious money [lit. ’their lung-money’].  This
much can be said: let AMERICA [1 group] agree to
give us bases with sole rights too in the places
where we want them”.

        M. BIDAULT is going to AMERICA
with General de GAULLE at the end of the month.  He
said that normal problems could be solved there.
Former difficulties in their relations with AMERICA,
such as the GIRAUD incident, had now been forgotten
and instead a sincere atmosphere had developed.
It was expected that the meeting would yield
fruitful results.

        The Foreign Minister asked me what was the
position about the STRAITS.  I said there was
nothing fresh from us.  and it was understood from
TRUMAN'S speech that the question had been discussed
at POTSDAM, but not solved.  He asked what I thought
of President TRUMAN'S proposal.  I said I could not
express any opinion, because I was unaware of our
Government’s attitude.  The proposal, however,
seemed to indicate an 'open door' policy, vhich was
in fact contradiction to the Russians’ ideas, and
that this 'open door' might even extend to the
RHINE and DANUBE, and thus penetrate into the heart
of EUROPE.  In my opinion, I explained, the result
of the two sets of ideas would be a solution in the
usual style, namely the retention by TURKEY of
control over the STRAITS, with all rights and
obligations.  After a certain amount of thought,
M. BIDAULT said that to those who knew EUROPE well,
the second of these two systems was quite
impracticable, and an extremist doctrine.  He
admitted that the result would most probably be as
I had said.  I declared I was glad to hear this
view expressed by a distinguished member of the
Five-Power Council.

        My interlocutor said he definitely could
not agree to the settlement of the Peace Treaties
with BULGARIA, ROUMANIA and HUNGARY between the
Three Great Powers, and he was making the necessary
representations to the Governments concerned.
FRANCE could not be left exposed from any quarter,
he said, especially when it was a question of an
area like the BALKANS, which always had been, and

                                            always

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always would be, the axis of European Security.

        He enquired about the DODECANESE Islands.
I said I had no information, but I had seen that the
Anatolian Agency published a report to the effect
that our Government was not making any territorial
claims.  I indicated forthwith that a gradually
increasing solidarity in the relations between
TURKEY and GREECE [3 groups] was a matter of vital
importance.  The Minister indicated his approval
several times over, and spoke himself of
MEDITERRANEAN solidarity in the immediate future.
"The close association between TURKEY and GREECE
will be one of the bonds in this solidarity”, he
added.

        The Middle East question, he said, was
not closed.  He would be delighted to see an
identity of views between TURKEY and FRANCE in that
area.  He asked whether I knew anything about
Your Excellency’s visit to BEIRUT.  I said I had
not received any news, but it was natural for you
to stop at BEIRUT on your overland journey.  The
representations made by the Lebanese to get their
independence recognised were well-known, I explained,
and they and the Syrians had probably raised the
same question with you.  I outlined our point of
view on the question of Syrian and Lebanese
independence.  He expressed his approval and
thanked me.

        The Foreign Minister is anxious about
GERMANY.  He explained that if the area given to
the Poles on the right finds no corresponding change
in favour of FRANCE on the left, the result will be
the displacement of GERMANY’S axis to the left: the
German ——— would thus be set on the frontiers of the
ALPS.  He declared that he well understood the
reason for [? the Soviets']	———s in favor of German
unity, like BISMARCK, but he could not discover
what the British meant by upholding this point of
view.

        The Minister went on to say that if the
events which had so changed circumstances had not
come about, this unity would have been presented
as Soviet domination over all EUROPE.  Now, however,
the matter had to be assessed afresh.

                                            When

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        When I signified that the British and
French must of necessity march together, he said
that he would do [1 group] to facilitate this.
Following JAPAN’S offer to surrender, he
said, the French had appointed a Governor-General
to INDOCHINA.  I said that I had seen that the
[? Indian or ? Indo-] ——— had been mentioned during
the Russo-Chinese negotiations, and I asked the
Foreign Minister what he thought.
He replied that RUSSIA was very far away;
as for the Chinese, they considered it useful to
have a second Great Power within the Russo-American
———; [? Fighting] FRANCE would not renounce her
rights.

        I asked whether this conversation between
RUSSIA and CHINA might indicate that there would be
compensation for CHINA corresponding to Russian
expansion.  My question made the Minister uneasy.
He thought a while and limited his reply to a
statement that FRANCE would not abandon her rights.

    4.	I must apologise for the length of my
report, but I cannot finish without stating the
conclusions, as they seem to me, in so far as they
affect our own country.

        American opinion has now taken its stand
alongside British opinion over the STRAITS question.
[? I will] not analyse the proposal.
Your Excellency can appreciate much better than
I the meaning and significance.  If the Russians
feel it necessary to make a complete [? volte-face]
in view of the new situation, i think that they will
consider it best to [4 groups] certain modifications
in their standpoint in order to disembarrass
themselves of the proposal.  It is not a mistake to
consider the development of the STRAITS question
(from the ——— angle) as being advantageous to TURKEY.
It is noteworthy that the overthrow of JAPAN and the
Russians' entry into the Far East war and their
rapid advance in MANCHURIA and KOREA has changed the
focal point of interest from EUROPE to ASIA.  The
most important question of the day six weeks ago was
the STRAITS question: it is such no longer.

        The matter vhich must be solved in ASIA

                                                is

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is not the question of JAPAN but the question of
CHINA.  RUSSIA and AMERICA lying opposite each
other in the PACIFIC are faced with such great
difficulties as the solution of a situation which
is ———, and the establishment of some sort of
[? modus vivendi]. The STRAITS have lost the
force and [2 groups] amid the solution of the
great Asiatic interests.  The question is, however,
vital for BRITAIN and EUROPE and I do not think that
the Americans will be able to sacrifice BRITAIN.

        [Dept. Note: An obscure passage follows
giving MENEMENCIOGLU’s views about the atomic bomb.
The Ambassador, it would appear, thinks that the
nations will be too frightened to go to war with
each other even though they adopt a warlike attitude].

        As for the Turkish question, it is not
one of the things that can be solved without
creating a most acute crisis in international
relations.  It seems that the present situation
[4 groups] our country, development towards complete
security.  Our affair has lost much of its former
seriousness.  Amid the darkness, the dawn of right
and of a resplendent future based on right has
begun to [appear].

                                MENEMENCIOGLU.