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Pershing Advocated Unconditional Surrender

The following text is based on OCR of images of General Pershing's letter to the Allied Supreme War Council arguing against the armistice of November 11, 1918, reformatted for readability as a web page, using italics to emphasize sections of the text relevant to the demand for unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan in WWII.
Pershing was prescient in arguing that failure to definitively defeat the German army was going to jeopardize the opportunity "to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence".

PARIS, October 30, 1918
TO: The Allied Supreme War Council, Paris
Gentlemen:
In considering the question of whether or not Germany's request
                for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my
                opinion from the military point of view.
1. Judging by their excellent conduct during the past three
                months, the British. French, Belgian, and American armies appear
                capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale
                is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it
                so.
2. The American army is constantly increasing in strength and
                experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important
                part in the Allied offensive. Its growth, both in personnel and
                material, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not
                counting the Italian army, should be more than equal to the
                combined losses of the Allied Armies.
3. German manpower is constantly diminishing and her armies have
                lost over 300,000 prisoners and over one-third of their
                artillery during the past three months in their effort to
                extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid
                disaster.
4. The estimated strength of the Allies on the western front, not
                counting Italy, and of Germany [respectively],
                
in rifles is:

                
                    
                        Allies
                        1,563,000
                    

                        Germany
                        1,134,000
                    

                        An advantage in favor of the Allies of
                            37%.
                        
                    

            
In guns:

                
                    
                        Allies
                        22,413
                    

                        Germany
                        16,495
                    

                        Advantage of 35% in favor of the Allies
                        
                    

            
If Italy’s forces should be added to the western front we should
                have a still greater advantage.
5. Germany’s morale is undoubtedly low, her Allies have deserted
                her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore, we
                should take full advantage of the situation and continue the
                offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.
6. An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German army
                and enable it to reorganize and resist later on, and would
                deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to
                press their present advantage to its complete military end.
7. As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace
                may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and
                their motives. The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to
                enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more
                advantageous.
8. On the other hand, the internal political conditions of
                Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically
                forced to ask for an armistice to save the overthrow of her
                present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the
                Allies as precedent to permanent peace.
9. A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones if
                it does not render impossible the imposition of satisfactory
                peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army
                with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms
                were not satisfactory to her.
10. An armistice would lead the Allied Armies to believe this the
                end of fighting and it would be difficult if not impossible to
                resume hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the
                event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we have
                fought for.
11. By agreeing to an armistice under the present favorable
                military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of
                a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace the Allies would
                jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose
                the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would
                insure its permanence.
12. It is the experience of history that victorious armies are
                prone to overestimate the enemy’s strength and too eagerly seek
                an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now
                on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her
                victories of the last four years.
13. Finally, 1 believe the complete victory can only be obtained
                by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from
                Germany, but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an
                armistice the terms should be so rigid that under no
                circumstances could Germany again take up arms.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN J. PERSHING,

                                               General, United States Army,

                                                   Commander-in-Chief,

                                               American Expeditionary Forces.

Allies	1,563,000
Germany	1,134,000
An advantage in favor of the Allies of 37%.

Allies	22,413
Germany	16,495
Advantage of 35% in favor of the Allies