2. Japanese in Europe see U.S. softening:
On 20 July the Japanese Naval Counselor in Bern forwarded to Tokyo a message from Shintaro Ryu (local representative of the newspaper Asahi and reportedly a friend of Prince Konoye) in which Ryu reiterated his previously expressed view (on 15 Jul 45) that the United States wished to end the war with Japan in order to forestall Russian intervention in the Far East; Ryu concluded:

"This belief gains credence in view of the fact that the United States, in addition to her continuing attitude of bombing and shelling the homeland to the limits of her mobilized strength, has suddenly hastened peace negotiations with Japan*. On the one hand, peace conditions which have been released on several occasions by the press and radio—-apart from the matter of the authenticity of those conditions—-are proof that they are bending toward us to a remarkable degree. On the other hand, although the American authorities have repeatedly declared that they have had no peace proposals from Japan, the phenomenon is such as was not seen in the case of Germany. The above is proof that American public opinion is demanding peace and that the American authorities likewise are daily awaiting our peace proposals.

*Possibly a reference to Captain Zacharias' broadcast of the 19th.

"Viewed in the light of recent activities, all this gives us the profound impression that if we were to make a peace proposal immediately with rather favorable conditions, the United States would promptly accept it. We believe, however, that after the Potsdam Conference this last golden opportunity will be lost forever."

On 26 July Japanese Envoy Harada at the Vatican relayed to Tokyo various items from the American and British press which he said pointed to an increasing sentiment in favor of ending the war. Among other things, he cited the views expressed by President Hutchins of the University of Chicago, and by Senators Capehart and White, ^{Capehart and White had been quoted in the New York Times as believing the war might be ended earlier if the U.S. clarified the terms of surrender (as was ultimately done in the Potsdam Declaration). Capehart in particular had said "he did not subscribe to the view that we must destroy Japan's present form of Government and then spend years in occupation and 'teaching a different form of Government.'".
See pages 82, 83, and 125 of Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World War II, Marc Gallicchio for a good discussion of this.} and quoted an article by Raymond Moley to the effect that there was more and more support for a soft peace in Washington. Harada concluded:

"This recent change in the tone of American and British public opinion still seems to be confined to a minority, but it is a tendency which will bear watching, to see to what extent it will develop in the future if the enemy is plunged into bloodier and bloodier battles."