The Szilard Memo Submitted to Byrnes on May 28, 1945

In March 1945 reknowned physicist Leo Szilard drafted a memo that argued against use of the atomic bomb and attempted to obtain an audience with President Truman, but was directed instead by Truman's Appointments Secretary Matthew J. Connelly to meet with James F. (Jimmy) Byrnes , whom Truman was about to appoint as his Secretary of State.

So on May 28, 1945, Szilard, accompanied by chemist Harold Urey and physicist Walter Bartky, traveled to Byrnes' home in South Carolina to present his arguments against the use of the bombs. (Some sources give the meeting date as May 29. Perhaps they traveled on the 28th and met the following day.)

Although you would surely get the impression from revisionist treatments of this episode that in this meeting Byrnes had callously rejected a plea from Szilard that the bomb should not be used against Japan on humanitarian grounds, in fact the memo hardly mentions Japan. Rather, it argues that America should keep its success in bomb development a closely guarded secret, lest an enemy nation (the USSR in particular), learning that atomic bombs were a practical possibility, develop its own, smuggle them into America's industrial centers, and detonate them all at once, destroying the basis of U.S. military might on the first day of a war. It also presents at lengths Szilard's very politically naive proposals for international controls on nuclear fission technologies.

Being well aware from his role as FDR's "Assistant President" of the nature of the Manhattan Project, Byrnes rightly saw Szilard's arguments as absurd, as he had been told earlier by General Marshall that the Soviets would probably have the secret in two or three years, and as a former Senator, knew that once the war ended Congress was going to want to know just what was the secret project they'd allowed $2 billion to be spent on, and was not going to fund any further development if not told. And having been at Roosevelt's side at the Yalta conference, he had some direct experience in negotiation with the Russians.

The following excerpts contain the only mentions of Japan in Szilard's memo. Neither in these paragraphs nor elsewhere in the document is there any argument against use of the bombs on moral grounds.

ATOMIC BOMBS AND THE POSTWAR POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD

Spring 1945

The development of the atomic bomb is nowadays mostly considered from the point of view of its possible use in the present war and such bombs are likely to be available in time to be used before the war ends. However, their role in the ten years which will follow can be expected to be far more important and it seems that the position of the United States in the world may be adversely affected by their existence. The following might very well turn out to be the future course of events:

Before the end of the war we shall use atomic bombs against Japan. These bombs will be much less powerful than we now know could be made and which in all likelihood will be made within two or three years; yet the first bomb that will be detonated over Japan will be spectacular enough to start a race in atomic armaments between us and other nations.

In a few months Russia's war with Germany may be over. The work on uranium will then undoubtedly be given a high priority there but it will perhaps still not be carried out on a large industrial scale until we detonate our first atomic bomb and thus demonstrate the success of this development. For a few years after that we shall almost certainly be ahead of Russia. But even if we assume that ve could keep ahead of her in this development all the time, this may neither offer us protection from attack nor necessarily give us substantial advantage in case of war six years from now.

. . . .

Such a demonstration may take place in the course of the war. However, the psychological advantages of avoiding the use of atomic bombs against Japan and, instead, of staging a demonstration of the atomic bomb at a time which appears most appropriate from the point of view of its effect on the governments concerned might be very great. Therefore this possibility seems to deserve serious consideration in deciding whether or not to use such a bomb against Japan. If at the time when we demonstrate the atomic bomb to the world we had the second stage of the atomic power development "in the bag", chances of obtaining the consent of Russia to some satisfactory system of controls might be considerably improved. At that time, Russian physicists would probably be quite uncertain as to whether or not they could catch up with us in this development . . . .

[The document continues at great length to expostulate Szilard's opinions on issues of international control. An image of several drafts of the document can be viewed in the collection of Leo Szilard's papers at UC San Diego, specifcally at Atomic bombs and the postwar position of the United States in the world. Memorandum to have been placed before President Roosevelt prior to the first bomb test in New Mexico. Typescript, carbon copies, and mimeograph censored copy, 1945 ]