Togo Interviews

Statement by Former Foreign Minister TOGO, Shigenori
Concerning the Historical Facts Surrounding the Ending of
the Pacific War (1)

17 May 49

Statement by: TOGO, Shigenori
            Minister of Foreign Affairs,
              17 Oct 41 – 1 Sep 42
              9 Apr 45 – 17 Aug 45

Witnesses: YAMAZAKI, Tosuke (G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC)
OI, Atsushi
HARA, Shiro

Stenographer: NODA, Ichiro

Date and place: 17 May 49
Sugamo Prison, TOKYO

OI: We are employees of the GHQ Historical Section currently engaged in a study of conditions and events in JAPAN around the end of the war. In the course of the project, which is now largely completed, we have gone over SAKOMIZU's memoirs, read the article "To the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration" written by KASE, Toshikazu under the pen name AKINAGA, Akira for IWANAMI’s magazine SEKAI, consulted the US bombing survey reports, interviewed numerous people, and, needless to say, studied your own testimony before the military tribunal. There have proved to be so many differences and discrepancies in the accounts of the people we have talked to, and so many obscure and dubious points in the published material, that we have felt it desirable to talk to you, a man who played a highly important role during that period, and to ask you some questions — indeed, we must do so if we are to make this an accurate history. The authorities have granted our request for permission to see you, and it is for that reason that we are here today. We have been working extremely hard on this assignment because we believe that what we are writing, although it is, of course, strictly historical, will be of great value in the future. We hope that we may count on your cooperation.

TOGO: I was informed that Mr. CASE would come today. Is he not here?

OI: Mr. CASE is the executive officer who arranges such meetings. He does not attend them himself.

TOGO: Do I understand that you work under Mr. CASE?

OI: We work independently, so to speak.

TOGO: I understand that you will report on this interview to the Historical Section, And that the report will be incorporated in the files of that organization.

OI: That is correct.

TOGO: Whatever I say here will go into their archives?

OI: We have to turn in a record of it.

TOGO: Since you are working for SCAP, the record you prepare would naturally become a part of the SCAP Archives.

OI: That is the way it works.

TOGO: Aren't you sure?

OI: While working on this job, we have encountered many doubtful points and discrepancies in individual statements. What you tell us will help us to straighten those out.

TOGO: I want to tell you something at the outset. As you have just mentioned, I did discuss the end of the war in my affidavit, but that document, which was very long originally, was cut down considerably because it was not necessary that it be so long for the trial, and, as a result, it is more or less a patchwork affair which may contain sections difficult for the ordinary person to understand. I had to leave it that way because I was pressed for time. In the light of this experience, I feel that the only way I can be of help to you is to talk to you in some detail. I shall be glad to cooperate with you in that way if you will provide me with a copy of your record of what I have said.

Another thing. I have no objection to your use of information provided by me as a basis for reconciling what appear to you to be contradictory statements, but, inasmuch as other people may come along and draw conclusions different from yours, I want that information to be put into the SCAP files and not to be kept by you personally. If that is not to be done, it will be useless for me to talk to you. If it is to be done, I can tell you what you want to know.

OI: As I told you, we have a stenographer here to take down what you say, and as I understand it the record will go into the SCAP archives regardless of whether or not we request that such action be taken. We have come here in the belief that such would naturally be the case, but we have made no specific request.

TOGO: You collect the data from various sources, draw conclusions, and submit the conclusions to your superiors. I assume that, in order to discharge your responsibilities to SCAP conscientiously, you also submit the data upon

which the conclusions are based.

OI: That is correct.

TOGO: I understand, then, that you submit your data to SCAP and that the data go into the archives. If you definitely follow that procedure, I will talk to you.

OI: We have turned in all our other interrogation reports, and I believe the authorities have kept them

TOGO: If you submit your data along with your conclusions, I will be satisfied.

OI: We have run across a number of problems in the course of our research for one section of a sort of history of the Pacific war — a relatively small, non-military section. That is why we have come to see you today.

TOGO: If as you said, you submit not only your conclusions but also your data to the Americans, I have no objection to talking to you.

OI: I think that is what will happen.

TOGO: That has been the usual procedure, has it not?

OI: That is what we have been doing with interrogation reports. For the benefit of future historians, both the interpretations and the interrogations themselves are submitted.

TOGO: I have a request to make of you. I want a copy of your report.

OI: I will ask my superiors about it.

TOGO: I am ready to begin to talk now, but I am afraid three hours will not be enough time if I am to cover the subject in detail.

OI: How about taking up these questions one by one? We should like to hear the overall story in as much detail as time will allow.

TOGO: I think it will be a good idea for me to tell you whatever I happen to think of in connection with each of these questions and for you to ask questions at will as I go along. As to the time element, I understand that you plan to talk to KIDO this afternoon, but why not come to see me some other time to discuss anything we don't cover this morning. I could see you tomorrow.

OI: Yes, we might come in tomorrow. We are going to see KIDO this afternoon.

TOGO: Well, let's get on to question one — was any effort made toward a general peace during the tenure of the Tojo Cabinet, and, if so, what was its nature?

As you yourselves know, JAPAN was winning all her battles during the Tojo regime (that is, immediately after the war began); she was intoxicated with victory. The authorities expected the war to last a long time, and the military, in particular, were firmly convinced that it would be ended not by a peace treaty but by prolongation of the hostilities until the enemy was exhausted, a process which, it was said, might require 15 or 20 years. In this connection, I recall that, sometime around the end of January 1942, UEHARA, Etsujiro, who had until recently been a minister of state, asked a question on foreign policy at a plenary budget session of the Diet, in the course of which he expressed the opinion that the war should be brought to a conclusion and inquired as to whether the Foreign Minister was considering steps toward that end. My reply, that it was, of course, necessary to work for peace, and that I was fully prepared and resolved to do so, aroused a storm of protest in the Diet; it was asserted that the object of the war was to destroy the enemy, that I had been wrong to express an interest in peace, and that my remark should be stricken from the record. I insisted that it was a perfectly natural statement and should be allowed to stand, but strange

as it seems now, not only ordinary Diet members but also some Cabinet ministers were actually talking in those days about the prospect of occupying WASHINGTON, and, in view of that fact, the Premier told me that it would be best not to make an issue of my statement. I saw absolutely no necessity for its deletion, but, in accordance with a practice common at the time, it was excluded from the record. I agreed to let the matter go because, inasmuch as the statement had been made for the information of the Diet and not for the record, I did not consider it essential that it be preserved. At any rate, that will give you an idea of the atmosphere prevailing in the Diet.

OI: Isn’t it true that not all the members of the Diet felt that way?

TOGO: There is no point in mentioning names now, but I want you to understand that some members made the demand and a majority of the others supported them. It was not a time in which one could work for a general peace. I felt that the best thing to do under the circumstances was first to create isolated opportunities for peace and later to develop them into an overall effort, and I did what I could in that direction. It was, of course, utterly out of the question to come out with a concrete peace proposal at such a time; what I did was to try to pave the way for peace. For instance, as I stated in my affidavit, I sent a message to MOLOTOV through Ambassador SMETANIN, at the time of the latter’s departure for home in the spring of 1942, in which I said that JAPAN and RUSSIA, like a ray of sunlight in a shower, were the only two powers not at war, that it was my desire to extend this area of peace until it embraced the whole world, and that I hoped to have the co-operation of the USSR in my efforts.

That was one instance in which I demonstrated my resolve to work toward peace in general. Again, around the End of May 1942, I suggested an early termination of the China Incident to the Liaison Conference, expressing the opinion that, inasmuch as the Pacific War was an obvious outgrowth of the China problem, a solution of that problem resulting in peace between JAPAN and CHINA would hasten the end of the war. The proposal was greeted with unanimous approval, but no agreement could be reached as to the concrete measures to be adopted. One faction argued that, as long as Japanese victories had already driven the Chungking Government to the verge of collapse, the best way to restore peace in the FAR EAST was to go ahead and destroy it completely, well I took the stand that it would be impossible to wipe out the Kuomintang, and that JAPAN should seek a negotiated peace while she still held the upper hand. In the end, the military expressed a desire to study further action against CHINA and to think over ways and means of ending the war, and the matter was turned over to General Staff Headquarters.

OKAMOTO, then head of Department 2, subsequently told me on numerous occasions that General Staff Headquarters was working on the problem but that they had run into so many difficulties that they could not arrive at any conclusion. In the meantime, the Greater East Asia Ministry issue had come up, and in September 1942 I left the government.

Thus, I was unable to bring my China policy to fruition before resigning from the Cabinet. As regards RUSSIA, I had told the Liaison Conference that I thought JAPAN ought to work for a Russo-German understanding as one step along the road toward universal peace, a proposal which had met with fairly general approval, and, in July 1942,

had instructed Ambassador SATO in KUIBISHEV to be ready to bring up the peace question at any time, but that project, too, ended in failure, my resignation as Foreign Minister coming on 1 September, before the talks had begun. It was much later, after the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet, that concrete efforts for a general peace were made. So much for the first question.

OI: According to the court records, the Emperor said something to you in July 1942, but what he said to the Premier and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in February 1942 was not passed on to you.

TOGO: That was during the Tojo regime—the February 1942 statement.

OI: Did what the Emperor say in July have anything to do with your instructions to Ambassador SATO concerning the Russo-German peace and the general peace to follow?

TOGO: No, the story concerning the Emperor comes later, during the tenure of the Suzuki Cabinet. I see that there seems to be a relevant question further on, so I will discuss it in that connection.

HARA: A man by the name of MITAMURA, a henchman of NAKANO, Seigo’s, has been widely quoted in the press as having said that GREAT BRITAIN asked for peace when SINGAPORE fell.

TOGO: That is completely false. I don't want to go into too much detail, but you might be interested in this episode.

As British Ambassador CRAIGIE was leaving for ENGLAND after the outbreak of hostilities, I sent KASE, my private secretary, to him with a message. During the Japanese-American negotiations, I had suggested to CRAIGIE two or three times that BRITAIN should participate in the talks, inasmuch as she had extensive interests in the FAR EAST, and he had agreed and had made a recommendation to that effect to LONDON, which, however, had replied sharply that BRITAIN had entrusted the UNITED STATES with the Chinese problems and the related issues being discussed, and that the policy of His Majesty’s Government was to refrain from interfering as long as the talks continued. Through KASE, I now expressed my deep regret at the failure of the negotiations despite our mutual efforts to make of them a success, adding that there was nothing to do but fight now that war had been declared but that I hoped he would bear in mind, and, if he considered it appropriate to do so, tell his Government, that it would be best for all concerned to end the conflict promptly as soon as either side had lost hope of winning. According to KASE, Ambassador CRAIGIE replied that, upon reading the Hull Note for the first time after the outbreak of hostilities, he had personally felt the Japanese rejection of it to be quite natural, and that, although it was impossible for him to recommend a peace move to his Government at the present time, when ENGLAND was at a disadvantage, he appreciated the good intentions of the Japanese Foreign Minister. In the light of this exchange, it is apparent that there could have been no British peace proposal at that time; to conceive of the possibility of such a thing is to underestimate the perseverance of the British people. As a matter of fact, no such report ever came to my attention.

MITAMURA’s story, which I myself heard much later, was undoubtedly inspired either by NAKANO or by HATOYAMA, neither of whom was in a position to know the facts. NAKANO came to see me occasionally, but we never discussed any such thing. The report is untrue.

HARA: But it has become common knowledge in JAPAN?

TOGO: Such a thing is a logical impossibility.

OI: Let’s go on to the second question.

TOGO: Question 2--Did the Cairo Declaration constitute an obstacle to Japanese efforts toward peace? If so, in what way?

Yes, it did, because it called for Japan’s unconditional surrender and the return of part of her territories. Since unconditional surrender was utterly out of the question in those days, such a declaration made it impossible for JAPAN to work toward peace even if she should want to do so. The question of territories was approached on the assumption that JAPAN had been the aggressor in the Sino-Japanese War, but actually, as I think you all know, the clash that set off that war occurred when the Chinese sent troops into KOREA and JAPAN was forced by her treaty obligations to do likewise. It was universally acknowledged at the time that JAPAN fought in self-defense to keep CHINA from turning KOREA into a protectorate or vassal state. The interpretation presented in the Cairo Declaration, which distorted historical facts to brand the conflict as a Japanese War of aggression, was unacceptable to the people of this country, and, therefore, constituted a definite obstacle to peace efforts. In this connection, it might be noted that the Atlantic Charter prohibits any nation from seeking territorial aggrandizement by warlike methods. I suppose the Cairo Declaration took the rather strained position that JAPAN was to be required to relinquish the territories acquired in the Sino-Japanese conflict on the ground that they were the spoils of an aggressive war, but, at any rate, the declaration seems to me very much like a violation of the Atlantic Charter. Moreover, as I have just said, popular sentiment in JAPAN was such as to render the declaration a serious hindrance to peace efforts.

Since I resigned as Foreign Minister before the Cairo Declaration was issued, I am not in a position to tell you how the government felt about it. I think I might as well stop here.

OI: The same provisions were later incorporated in the Potsdam Declaration.

TOGO: That is why I have discussed it at such length. I have told you now what I should have told you later.

OI: Were you, as Foreign Minister, disturbed by the existence of the Cairo Declaration later, when the Potsdam, Declaration was promulgated?

TOGO: Yes. I still regarded it as illogical, unacceptable to the Japanese people, and a distortion of historical fact. I realize that I could not get anywhere with that attitude, however so I approached the problem from a different viewpoint.

OI: NO. 3. Please explain the circumstances culminating in the meetings of regular members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War on 11, 12, and 14 May 45. What subjects were discussed and what decisions were reached at the meetings?

I have with me a copy of a document prepared at that time which I think may have been drafted by the Foreign Minister.

TOGO: Where did you get it?

OI: This may not be authentic, although I think it is. We took it to the Foreign Office and showed it to the officials there, but they were not certain about it. We got it not from the Foreign Office but from the Naval General Staff files. I think what happened was that Adm. OIZAWA failed to pass on his copy to his successor, Adm. TOYODA, and that the Foreign Office gave TOYODA another copy in the name of the Foreign Minister. Could you shed some light on the matter?

TOGO: This is quite an interesting story. It is highly significant that the meetings of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War held on 11, 12 and 14 May were attended by members only. I knew from personal experience as the Foreign Office representative at the Liaison Conferences around the time the war began that at these meetings the secretaries would arrange the agenda, make the explanations, and monopolize a substantial proportion of the discussion. The regular members spoke in between and by no means dominated the meetings. At times, this system had its advantages, but it was more often inconvenient, as, for example, when the meetings were large and the military problems which constituted the main topics of discussion tended to be decided in favor of the strongest group present. Moreover, since the minor officials learned what went on at the meetings from the secretaries, it was essential for the council members to speak firmly if they were not to jeopardize their control over their underlings, and, as a result, extremely radical opinions were voiced by known conservatives. I became convinced at that time that the secretaries would have to go if we were to accompish anything at such talks, and, accordingly, I arranged to have members and members only present at the meetings we are discussing.

With OKINAWA as good as gone, the overall military situation at the time could well be described as dismal. Gen. UMEZU, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Gen. KAWABE, his deputy chief came to see me (the latter on two occasions) to suggest that we make diplomatic overtures to RUSSIA to block her entry into the war, but the international situation had deteriorated so irreparably that I told them they were asking me for something beyond my power. Pointing out that wartime diplomacy depended entirely on the military situation, and that, barring an early Japanese victory, any diplomatic endeavors were out of the question, I added that it was already too late to think about the Russians, who were quite possibly already discussing their share of the spoils with BRITAIN and AMERICA. I urged them to concentrate instead on the prosecution of the war.

Even more fantastic, the Navy wanted me to persuade the USSR to help JAPAN; they asked not only that we keep RUSSIA out of the war but also that we induce her to supply us with oil. OZAWA, the vice-chief of the Naval General Staff, and others told me that they wanted Russian airplanes and petroleum and were prepared to furnish cruisers in exchange. I explained how preposterous their idea was, pointing out that since it would be a violation of neutrality to accept such commitments, RUSSIA could not supply the materials unless she was prepared to go into the war on our side, which, in view of the existing military situation, could hardly be the case.

The Army and Navy kept after me, however until I finally suggested to UMEZU, who concurred heartily, that we call together the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War to discuss

the matter and that we bar the secretaries, whose presence would make it impossible to get down to fundamentals. UMEZU agreed to notify War Minister ANAMI and I promised to talk to the Premier and the Navy Minister. Our persuasions were fruitful, and these sessions, which were continued until the surrender, proved a great help to the very end. In the first place, discussions were outspoken, overall agreement was reached on most subjects, and an atmosphere generally favorable to ending the war was built up. Second, what was discussed did not reach the ears of minor officials; had it been otherwise, the surrender proposal might have been throttled by overwhelming opposition. The conferences were very valuable in that they maintained secrecy, a fact of which both Premier SUZUKI and SAKOMIZU often spoke approvingly. I would not be surprised if something of the sort appeared somewhere in writing, perhaps in SAKOMIZU’s memoirs.

OI: There is no specific mention of the effectiveness of the meetings, but one receives the impression that considerable importance was attached by a great many people to the fact that they were open to council members only.

TOGO: Certainly I believe it was around that time; that is, around 14 May, that one of the military leaders (I am not sure, but I think it was OIKAWA) suggested that we withhold all information concerning the meetings from our staffs, including vice-chiefs and vice-ministers, because the minor officials would be apt to stir up trouble if they learned that we were talking about peace. I supported the idea warmly, promising not to divulge anything to my subordinates, and, as late as July, hardly anyone at the Foreign Office knew anything about the peace maneuvers. The Army and Navy were apparently kept equally in the dark, inasmuch as SAKOMIZU complained that our endless discussions had aroused the suspicions Of the Chiefs of the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Bureaus. Both of these officials tried to sound me out, but I kept my promise and told them nothing. The secrecy campaign was obviously paying off.

I was prompted to suggest the meetings for still another reason; namely, because of my conviction that, since the Army had asked me to try to keep the USSR out of the war and the Navy had called upon me to drag her into it as our ally, the time was right to lay the ground-work for a general peace movement. I had thought from the beginning that the war would have to be ended soon; it had been with that understanding that I had entered the Suzuki Cabinet. I won’t go into detail here because I discussed the subject in my statement, but I might repeat that, whereas SUZUKI had predicted that we could fight on for another two or three years, I had felt that extended hostilities were not feasible and that the war should be ended immediately. I had told him that it would be useless for me to enter the cabinet unless he himself was determined to work for an early peace, and had finally accepted the Foreign Ministry portfolio with the understanding that he would do so.

My aims would best be realized, I thought, by getting the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War to meet by themselves and then gradually building up an atmosphere favorable to peace. Great difficulty would be expected if the issue were brought to the fore before the top man In the Government and the High Command were given sufficient time to prepare themselves for it. Unless the leaders, at least, could be persuaded to listen to reason, the results would be domestic turmoil of such major proportions as to endanger

any peace negotiations we might undertake. My basic idea in suggesting these meetings was that it was absolutely essential to create an opportunity for general discussion and for the development of an overall attitude favorable to peace.

As might have been expected in view of the circumstances leading to their inauguration, the conferences began with a consideration of the Russian question. The Army’s contention that we should keep RUSSIA out of the war, the Navy’s stand that we should induce her to adopt a friendly policy towards our Government, and my own view that we should strive for a general peace were all reviewed. During the first day’s discussion, which centered on the extent to which RUSSIA could be utilized, I maintained that it was useless to expect any military or economic aid whatever. I said that I had always told my colleagues in the Government that we would have to act before RUSSIA, the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN got together if we were ever to utilize RUSSIA, effect a general rapprochement with her, or encourage her and GERMANY to lay down their arms, but that, while we stood around watching, the Allies had met with the Russians at CAIRO, at TEHERAN, and now at YALTA. Navy Minister YONAI replied that he did not agree that it was too late to utilize RUSSIA’s vital military resources and to wheedle her into granting us favors. (Although it is beside the point, I might say that this was my first and last serious disagreement with YONAI, with whom I had worked in perfect harmony on every issue ever since joining the Suzuki Cabinet.) I said that if he felt that way it showed that he did not know the USSR, to which he retorted that a former Foreign Minister with more experience than I had still not given up hope. He gave the man’s name but I will not repeat it here. I objected vigorously that it was impossible for anyone who knew RUSSIA to make such a statement and that there was no justification at all for believing that RUSSIA could be induced to take a favorable stand toward our Government or to supply us with airplanes and petroleum, but the Premier suggested that we would lose nothing by sounding out the USSR casually, and it was agreed that no harm could be done. It was finally decided to begin negotiations with a three-fold object; first to keep the USSR out of the war, a necessity which was felt strongly by all; second, to induce her to adopt a friendly policy toward JAPAN; and third, to seek her mediation in the war.

At the time I pointed out that RUSSIA, which had always feared war with JAPAN, could hardly be favorably disposed toward this country now; that she was bound to feel that more was to be derived from helping the Allies than from throwing in her lot in with a nation tottering on the brink of defeat; and that accordingly, continued Russian neutrality, a pro-Japanese policy and mediation would be available only at a reasonable price. All agreed on this last point, and we took up the question of compensation immediately, reaching a general understanding by the 15th. I suppose that is what you are talking about?

OI: Was the proposed compensation set down in itemized form?

TOGO: The original document, which was the same as my draft except for minor additions, was signed by the Premier, the War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff and myself and kept at the Foreign Minister’s official residence. Both the house and the document were burned in the air raid of 30 May, so I prepared an identical copy, explained to the Premier what had happened and obtain his

signature, noted the circumstances on the document, and signed it myself.

The reward we were offering RUSSIA was, in essence, restoration of the situation prevailing before the Russo-Japanese War, except as regard the status of Southern MANCHURIA. This would mean abrogation of the Treaty of Portsmouth and cancellation of all fishing rights based thereon. RUSSIA held high hopes for Northern MANCHURIA and could be expected to demand it. A buffer state would be created from Southern MANCHURIA to forestall the friction which would be certain to develop if it were within the sphere of influence of either nation.

OI: Does this mean you met on the 15th as well as on the 11th 12th and 14th

TOGO: The meetings were continued until the surrender.

OI: Was this document prepared after the series of meetings, rather than at the beginning?

TOGO: The document is merely a record of conclusions reached at the meetings.

OI: Of decisions?

TOGO: Yes.

OI: The document mentions that certain decisions have been reached, but the date is not clear. Perhaps the document is incomplete.

TOGO: There is no reference to any decisions in the original. OIKAWA must have inserted it himself.

OI: It says, “At the conferences of the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War held on 11, 12 and 14 May 1945, the following agreements were reached.”

TOGO: I believe that is how it started.

OI: Did you write this after the session on the 14th?

TOGO: Yes, after the meeting on the 14th.

OI: According to information I have received, around the time this talk of utilizing the SOVIET UNION began, people were led to believe that such negotiations might succeed by the fact that the Russian attitude toward the Okinawa campaign was relatively friendly; i.e., that the Tass News Agency, which had reported the Leyte and other battles in a matter unfavorable to JAPAN, now seemed to be more sympathetic.

TOGO: I had heard that TASS had commented favorably on the Japanese conduct of the Okinawa Campaign, but that was certainly by little consequence as far as our decision was concerned. The primary reason for the decision was, of course, the desire of the Army Navy to keep the USSR out of the war or entice her to come over to our side.

OI: Certain documentary sources and investigation reports indicate that the Minister Of War, upset by news of the German defeat, advocated some sort of meeting to decide on a complete reversal of Japanese policy. I am not certain whether or not that had anything to do with these meetings…

TOGO: That may be true, but the Minister of War never advocated convening a meeting of council members only. He was, of course, in favor of the meetings, but they were not launched on his initiative.

OI: What was the general reaction to your proposal that JAPAN strive for a general peace through Russian mediation?

TOGO: The center of the talks shifted to the general peace mentioned in Item 3. There was no objection to the idea of peace, but considerable controversy arose over the conditions for such a truce. War Minister ANAMI pointed out in forceful language that we should remember above all that JAPAN still retained a large chunk of enemy territory and had not lost the war, to which I replied that, although OKINAWA was the only sizable piece of territory we had relinquished to the enemy, it was the forthcoming developments on the warfront that would count, and that it was impossible to visualize peace conditions merely on the basis of captured or lost territory. Opposition to my position mounted as we went on, until the Navy Minister suddenly suggested shelving Item 3 for the time being. I had hoped the talks would be developed further — at least far enough to preclude possible complications at a later date — but the Premier felt that the decision could be postponed until the Soviet attitude was sounded out. This accounts for the delay on Item 3.

OI: What about Question No. 4?

TOGO: Let’s see, that deals with the Imperial Conference on 8 June, doesn’t it? That meeting grew out of the prevailing atmosphere in JAPAN — the atmosphere I have just described. Despite the depressing military situation, many people still did not feel it necessary to seek an end to the war, and even Premier SUZUKI, who wanted peace in due time, felt that the essential thing was to sustain the national morale at all costs. In line with this idea of building up morale, it was suggested that the Diet be called into session. The Navy regarded the proposal with a certain amount of reserve, but the army greeted it with open arms, and a section of it, at least, drew up big plans to start the ball rolling at that time for a decisive homeland battle.

The Diet opening had been set for 9 June. Prior to that (I think it was around the 6th), I was suddenly notified that there was to be a meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War. The notice said nothing about the purpose of the meeting or the subjects to be discussed. When the conference got underway, I was surprised to discover that a very strongly-worded resolution to continue the war was being brought up for debate. Whereas the Premier and Army and Navy Bureau Chiefs had had previous word from subordinates attending the meeting as secretaries (the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Chiefs of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus), the Foreign Office, which had no secretary, had been left completely in the dark; I did not see the draft until I entered the conference room. The whole thing was a surprise to me. AKINAGA, the head of the Composite Planning Bureau, said that studies of the national strength indicated

that the country was in very bad shape, added that it would be virtually impossible to go on with the war unless production was stepped up, and expressed the opinion that higher production was not impossible. Chief Cabinet Secretary SAKOMIZU then pointed out the necessity of elevating the nation’s morale and maneuvering to gain support abroad. (SAKOMIZU was evidently driving at RUSSIA.) Deputy Chief KAWABE, speaking on behalf of Chief of Staff UMEZU, who was away on a tour, admitted the gravity of the situation but said he saw no reason for alarm, since the closer the battleground shifted to the homeland, the more favorable conditions would become for JAPAN. Taking the floor, I then said that Japan’s failing strength was obviously the thing we had to worry about; that, with the enemies air offensive gradually mounting in intensity, increased production would be extremely difficult to attain; and that, as long as we lacked adequate strength in the air, I could not endorse the Deputy Chief Of Staff’s view that the situation would develop favorably as the enemy drew closer to the mainland, inasmuch as we could expect the enemy to attempt a landing only after his air arm had wiped out our production facilities completely. I repeated that I was skeptical about the possibility of increasing production in the face of intensified bombing and said that it was high time we resigned ourselves to our fate.

While admitting that it would be extremely difficult to increase production, Munitions Minister TOYODA, who had been brought in to attend the Meeting, said that there was still hope if all concerned, both military and civilians, would agree to co-operate in certain specific ways. The idea was that, if the necessary conditions for increased production were met, continuation of the war would be possible. I told them flatly that the necessary conditions would be hard to secure — that what the Munitions Minister advocated would be almost impossible of fulfillment — but the draft resolution embodying the view of the Munitions Minister was submitted anyway. The Navy Minister remained silent throughout. I said that I had my doubts about the advisability of putting such a resolution into writing, but the premier insisted that the circumstances demanded it. That is the story of the resolution. The final draft was revised somewhat; I think it stipulated that the war would be continued if production could be increased by September.

This conditional decision to continue the war was motivated by the premier’s view that it was essential to adopt a strong resolution before the Diet met in order to improve the nation’s flagging morale. The issue got as far as the Imperial Conference on the 8th. I agreed to the resolution after I had made it plain that I considered the attached conditions practically unobtainable. I think the Premier felt the resolution was necessary to satisfy the Diet.

At the Imperial Conference, I said that our prestige abroad was so low that it was impossible to expect outside aid and that we must awaken at once to the fact that further deterioration of the war situation could only make our international position still worse, but the resolution was passed without further discussion.

In view of the circumstances, there was no place for peace talks on the agenda of the Supreme Council for Direction of War meetings on 6 and 8 June. At the session on the 6th, the secretaries requested that I strive to induce RUSSIA to adopt a favorable stand and to supply us with war materials. I told them that that was out of the question, and that if the decision to continue to fight had been based

on any such idea I was doubly opposed to it, whereupon they denied that such was the case and said it was only a hope. I retorted that wild hopes could lead us into error and that the idea of regarding the SOVIET UNION as a potential ally should be abandoned immediately.

OI: We have a summary record of speeches delivered by the Foreign and Greater East Asia Minister at Imperial Conferences; a document issued by the Cabinet which contains the minutes of the conferences, showing what each speaker said on a given occasion. The report on the national strength read by AKINAGA is here, as is the gist of the speech delivered by the Greater East Asia Minister. Did you read from a manuscript?

TOGO: I can’t say for certain unless I see it, but, as a rule, I used a manuscript prepared by a subordinate Bureau. I did not read directly from the manuscript but inserted various comments I thought appropriate and omitted some portions.

OI: Then there is the appraisal of the international situation — which Chief Secretary SAKOMIZU read.

TOGO: I scolded the Chief Secretary for meddling in international affairs.

OI: This apparently was at the meeting on the 6th, too.

TOGO: Yes, it was.

OI: Did he consult you beforehand about this report?

TOGO: No, he did not I was given no previous notice of the meeting, so it was only natural that I was not consulted. The view that it should not be impossible to drag RUSSIA into the war, which I believed was contained therein, was absolutely contrary to my own opinion.

OI: This is so different from your own statements that comparison is hardly possible, there seems to be a definite conflict

TOGO: I didn’t know anything at all about SAKOMIZU’s statement.

OI: You didn’t?

TOGO: This business of the secretaries used to go on back in the days of the Liaison Conference, the predecessor of the Supreme Council for Direction of War. Where the Chief of Department 2 of General Staff Headquarters and the Chief of Department 3 of the Naval General Staff made a habit of discussing foreign affairs without consulting the Foreign Office. But to return to this meeting — since the Foreign Office Was not represented by a secretary at the Supreme Council for Direction of War, and since somebody on that level had to do the preliminary work, I suppose they thought the Chief Cabinet Secretary could handle foreign affairs. Anyway, I took care to point out that the Chief Cabinet Secretary was not in a position to know anything about diplomatic problems, and that he embarrassed us by unnecessary and incorrect statements.

OI: Under the heading, “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War,” this document reads, “Deriving our strength from the confidence born of absolute loyalty, we shall utilize the advantages of our

terrain and the unity of our people to prosecute the war to the end, that by so doing we may preserve the national polity, protect the Imperial soil, and accomplish the objectives of our holy war.” Paragraph 1 goes on to refer to strategy. “We shall prepare promptly for the homeland battle and concentrate our main fighting strength to that end.” There are two more lines giving details

Paragraph 2 says, “To assist the war effort, we shall take advantage of international developments and adopted vigorous and forceful foreign policy, particularly with respect to CHINA and to the SOVIET UNION.” Paragraph 3 deals with domestic measures; “All necessary steps will be taken within the country to render the homeland battle an all-out national effort.”

About Paragraph 2 — doesn’t this vaguely worded statement show some concern with peace, possibly through Russian mediation? Doesn’t, “a positive policy with respect to CHINA and the SOVIET UNION” imply an interest in peace?

TOGO: Yes, to some extent, but the idea of obtaining Russian assistance was uppermost. It was explained at the time that “a positive foreign policy” was to be interpreted in a general sense.

OI: The Supreme Council for the Direction of War document, which reads, “Deriving our strength from the confidence born of absolute loyalty, we shall utilize the advantages of our terrain and the unity of our people to prosecute the war to the end, that by so doing we may preserve the national polity, protect the Imperial soil, and assure a basis for the future development of the nation,” was very similar to the words later used by His Majesty on 14 August, but the document presented at the Imperial Conference read “… protect the Imperial soil and accomplish the objectives of our holy war” instead of “… and assure a basis for the future development of the nation.” I was wondering if that was a penciled correction made at the Supreme Council for the Direction of War.

TOGO: There may be some similarity to the Emperor’s 14 August statement. I think the part about securing a basis for the future development of the nation was deleted because it might be construed to mean the retention of occupied territories.

“The advantages of our terrain” refers to the Army’s idea that the closer to home we fought the greater our advantage would be, and “the unity of our people” means the national morale; the elevation of national morale by the Diet.

OI: According to SAKOMIZU’s memoirs — in the ASAHI I think it was — it was the understanding that JAPAN’s military objectives would be obtained and the war would be ended whenever we could be sure of being able to preserve the national polity and protect Japanese soil.

TOGO: I think the draft of the decision was written by SAKOMIZU and AKINAGA. SAKOMIZU may have felt that way about it. At any rate, the deletion of the phrase we were just discussing lest it be construed to mean the retention of occupied territories indicated a willingness to scale down our war aims considerably.

HARA: Am I correct in thinking not only that SAKOMIZU was chiefly responsible for the draft but also that Premier SUZUKI himself was firmly resolved to follow the policy outlined therein?

TOGO: Premier SUZUKI’s main idea at the time was to raise morale by calling the Diet into session; he felt that we had to keep up morale whether we entered the war or not. He did not actually plan to act on the decision; he merely thought it furnished a convenient springboard for a peace move. At least that was the impression I got when, in answer to the objections I raised, he said that we had to remember the Diet and that he didn’t think the decision itself would do any harm.

HARA: What do you think of the possibility that the premier disagreed but was subjected to pressure by the die-hard elements who favored continuing the war — especially the Army?

TOGO: No, I don’t think that was the case. It is true that a so-called “decisive homeland battle faction” had drawn up in the Army, and that it probably exerted some pressure in favor of the “advantages of terrain” clause, and it is also true that both the Premier and Navy Minister YONAI believed that a homeland battle would be a formidable undertaking, but I think SUZUKI’s stand stemmed from the fact that he still thought we could fight a while longer and was anxious to get on with his Diet morale-building scheme.

HARA: My point is that the decision was made at an Imperial Conference; it was a major policy decision taken in the presence of His Majesty. It’s hard to believe that SUZUKI would go to such lengths simply to further his Diet plan.

TOGO: I opposed the decision at the time on these very grounds. I told KIDO afterward that I had been greatly disturbed when suddenly confronted with the draft, and at the time of the 22 June Imperial summons I said again that I did not think that the decision reached at the Imperial Conference should be allowed to stand, but neither KIDO nor anybody else seem to feel that there was anything wrong with it. I was fully aware of the difficulties you have pointed out, and I tried to make them clear, but the general consensus was that the decision was all right. The whole episode smacked of opportunism.

HARA: I think Premier SUZUKI was completely sincere in feeling that we should fight with all our might on the one hand and do our best for peace on the other. Wasn’t a decision forced on him by elements favoring continuation of the war?

TOGO: No, I don’t think it was.

OI: As far as I have been able to determine, the man calling himself AKINAGA, Akira, who has obviously been connected with the Foreign Office, has written about the period during which KASE was the Foreign Minister’s secretary; reading his article gives one the impression that he himself was the Foreign Minister’s secretary and that he was profoundly influenced by his superior. He asserts uncompromisingly that the military behaved in an irrational manner. “The man who rides a tiger,” he says, “finds it difficult to alight. The military, after obtaining a supreme decision in favor of the homeland battle, triumphantly encouraged the Government to call a special Diet session.”

TOGO: I did not feel that strongly about it. I was displeased because the Supreme Council for the Direction of War (not the Imperial Conference) had been called so suddenly to consider such a decision, and I think I said as much; my subordinates may have known how I felt,

although I can’t remember much about that now. Incidentally, KASE was not my secretary at the time. Generally speaking, it is a risky business for subordinates who work on problems of limited scope to jump to conclusions about their superiors, or in a position to see the overall picture. At any rate, I do not think the homeland battle faction forced the decision on the Premier. I have already mentioned that when I expressed a doubt concerning the reference to continuation of the war, both SUZUKI and YONAI said that no harm was being done. To the Premier, who, as Mr. HARA said a moment ago, was interested both in fighting and in peace, the decision was more of a help than a hindrance, well YONAI, although he did not support it, regarded it as of no practical importance.

OI: Would you say that that statement summarizes your view of the matter?

TOGO: Yes. I told the Navy minister that he had surprised me by not coming to my assistance, and he replied that it was useless to oppose a document of that nature. That was the general attitude.

HARA: Gen. KAWABE has said that at the Imperial Conference the Premier spoke out forcibly for continuation of the war and that the fervor of his words made it impossible to conclude that he was merely cloaking his true feelings under pressure from the die-hard faction. KAWABE insists that the Premier really meant what he said, his view being that it was necessary to be prepared to continue the war, although, at heart, he was no less seriously contemplating peace.

TOGO: Speaking from the standpoint of the military, to a certain extent there was nothing else they could do. If they had said at the outset that the war should be terminated, they would have lost their position. It was natural that they should desire to move toward peace while continuing to fight the war and to fight it to their best advantage. I felt that SUZUKI too was swayed by these considerations.

OI: The point is whether there were two opposing sides in this debate — one wanting to end the war and the other to continue it. The question is whether the one side was maintaining that the war must be ended, yet holding that unless public morale were bolstered there would be utter collapse and admitting that unconditional surrender would be a preposterous and highly inadvisable method of ending the war, and the other side contending that peace must not be concluded for the present, their feeling being that now was no time to think of anything but the war.

TOGO: Neither SUZUKI nor YONAI felt that carrying on the war heedless of all else was the only solution. They did not think that the war should be continued rashly with no heed given to peace or some other solution. We must assume, I think, that SUZUKI had two things in mind at the same time.

OI: Let us turn to the fifth question — why you avoided direct negotiations with BRITAIN and AMERICA.

TOGO: At no time did I avoid direct negotiations with BRITAIN and AMERICA. It was BRITAIN and AMERICA who avoided negotiating for peace. First of all, we must remember that JAPAN was in no position to accept unconditional surrender at that time. This is fundamental. The UNITED STATES had been filling the air waves with demands for JAPAN’s unconditional surrender and predictions that JAPAN would very shortly

offer to surrender unconditionally, but there was no thought of unconditional surrender in this country. We were concerned with the steps to be taken to obtain suitable conditions; in other words, with how we could obtain a negotiated peace. Accordingly, we considered the neutral or other countries whose good offices might be made available to us. The Vatican was the first to be mentioned, but in view of the popes negative attitude toward the war, it was deemed virtually impossible to hope for aid from that quarter. CHIANG Kai-shek would not have been out of the question except that CHINA had committed herself to JAPAN’s unconditional surrender by the Cairo Proclamation. As for the neutral countries, there was little likelihood that either SWITZERLAND or SWEDEN would make a serious effort to obtain a conditional peace for JAPAN. Also, in regard to SWITZERLAND, I had been informed by Navy Minister YONAI that Mr. DULLES had approached our naval attaché in BERNE through the Japanese representative to the International Bank, Mr. KITAMURA, and advised him that it would be better for JAPAN to surrender unconditionally. As I thought it essential to sound out the possibilities in this direction, I arranged to have the Navy instruct KITAMURA to tell DULLES that the Japanese Government could by no means accept unconditional surrender, but, to my disappointment, YONAI told me some two weeks later, when I asked him if the reply had not yet been received, that on reconsideration he had decided against sending the telegram. Our diplomatic representatives there had reiterated that unconditional surrender was the only course open to us. Moreover, the strained relations existing between the Minister and the military attaches made it unwise to entrust them with such a delicate matter.

With no hope of negotiating for peace through SWEDEN or SWITZERLAND, the only alternative was to seek Russian mediation. Both the Army and the Navy were, as I said before enthusiastic to the point of wanting to draw in RUSSIA on our side, and the general consensus was that a peace overture should be made through the SOVIET UNION. It was my opinion, however, that the attitude of the SOVIET UNION was highly questionable; nor as I said, did I consider our relations with her to be friendly. I felt that we would have to pay a high price for Russian mediation and that we would do well to sound out her intentions first. Accordingly, I hesitated for some time before agreeing to approach RUSSIA. However the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, Government and civilian circles, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal all regarded the selection of RUSSIA as a foregone conclusion, and in the end it was decided to seek her good offices.

The SOVIET UNION had never given the slightest indication that she had promised, at either the Teheran or the Yalta conference, to enter the war against JAPAN at a future date. I was not Foreign Minister at the time of the conference, but, in regard to the Yalta Conference, I was told that the Government had instructed Ambassador SATO to ascertain if there had been any discussion of JAPAN, and that, in response to this inquiry, MOLOTOV had emphatically denied that JAPAN had been a subject of discussion.

Shortly before the fall of the Koiso Cabinet, RUSSIA had notified JAPAN of her intention to allow the Neutrality Pact to lapse, but she had stated at the same time that she had no objection to continuing neutrality for another year. I was extremely apprehensive over this development, and toward the end of April, after I had become Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet, I instructed Ambassador SATO to question the Russian Government about it. MOLOTOV again assured us

that the SOVIET UNION would maintain her neutral status as long as the Neutrality Pact remained in force and that, although she had given notice of her intention to abrogate the Pact at the conclusion of its effective period, she would continue to remain neutral.

No Japanese war-time Cabinet from the Tojo regime on had been able to prove that a secret agreement had been reached at the Teheran and Yalta Conferences concerning Russian entry into the war against JAPAN. That is why we approached the Russians though we were aware of the possible danger, rather than approaching BRITAIN and AMERICA only to be refused anything but unconditional surrender. As it happened our approach to RUSSIA resulted in the Potsdam Declaration, our desire for peace having been made known to BRITAIN and AMERICA by STALIN and MOLOTOV. The Potsdam Declaration was not unconditional. It set forth terms and therefore, it was conditional. Our overture to RUSSIA caused the Allies to set forth their surrender conditions.

OI: Speaking of direct negotiations, when the International Bank representative, KITAMURA and Commander FUJIMURA made contact with Mr. DULLES, couldn’t you, as Foreign Minister, have taken the initiative even though YONAI allowed the matter to drop?

TOGO: I sent off an urgent cable to our Minister to SWITZERLAND immediately thereafter, but, in the meantime, we communicated with RUSSIA and the Potsdam Declaration was announced. The reply from the Minister came too late to be of any use. I remember that the Minister replied that he, too, like Mr. DULLES, was of the opinion that there was no alternative to unconditional surrender. In the course of the trial, I requested that this matter be looked into, but I failed to obtain the information I wanted. I was told that the Foreign Office cable files for that period were not in TOKYO.

Since DULLES had said that he had recommended from the outset to GERMANY that she surrender unconditionally, that in the end she had done so, and that JAPAN should do likewise without delay, it did not seem feasible to attempt to obtain conditions through him.

OI: That will be all for today. We would like to see you again.

(End)

Statement by Former Foreign Minister TOGO,
Shigenori Concerning the Historical Facts
Surrounding the Ending of the Pacific War (2)

Date: 18 May 49 (Participants and place same as before)

OI: Let’s begin at once with Question 6.

TOGO: I heard about the matter first from MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa, the chief secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

I’ll explain how MATSUDAIRA happened to tell me about it. When the Suzuki Cabinet was formed, I was in KARUIZAWA. At SUZUKI’s request, I returned to TOKYO, and he asked me to assume the Foreign Minister portfolio. I told him I thought the military situation was so serious that it was essential to end the war promptly and said that I could not give him an answer until I knew his own opinion. He agreed that the situation was bad, but said he thought we could keep on fighting two or three years longer. Speaking at considerable length, I replied that, in view of present circumstances, I considered it impossible to go on for another two or three years and imperative to end the war at once, and I further pointed out that, since our opinions differed so markedly, we would be bound to disagree on various problems and would, therefore, find it very hard to work together if I were in the Cabinet. Nevertheless, he again asked me to accept, saying he thought we could get along, and suggested that, in view of the fundamental nature of the issue involved, I take a little time to think it over. I countered with a request for reconsideration on his part, and we parted late at night on that basis.

The following day, I described my talk with SUZUKI in detail to ex-premier OKADA, Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA (my senior in point of service with the Foreign Ministry), and ex-premier HIROTA, all of whom said that no other qualified man was available and urged me strongly to accept. I told them that it was useless for me to enter the Cabinet until the Premier had definitely made up his mind.

SAKOMIZU came to ask me to accept the post, saying that the Suzuki cabinet would face serious difficulties if I refused, but I sent him away with the reply that I could do nothing unless SUZUKI made up his mind.

Around the same time, MATSUDAIRA came to urge me to accept. I went over my stand with him, whereupon he remarked that, in his opinion, SUZUKI’s mind was not firmly made up and I could work on him after entering the Cabinet. He went on to say that I would not need to worry about ending the war because the Emperor himself seemed to be devoting a great deal of thought to the matter, and ended by asking me to take the job on the ground that I was the only person who can handle it. It was on this occasion that I first learned of his Majesty’s desire for peace.

Since we mentioned the Tokyo tribunal yesterday, I looked through my copies of the court documents in my case last night and

noted that MATSUDAIRA discusses the subject in some detail in his affidavit. As you probably know, SAKOMIZU’s affidavit also describes the circumstances surrounding my entry into the Suzuki Cabinet, as well as subsequent developments. I think you will find enough information in those documents to preclude the necessity of further detailed explanation on my part.

SAKOMIZU came to me again to ask me to talk to the Premier, which I did. SUZUKI then told me that I was free to act in accordance with the opinions I had expressed to him — that is, he accepted my position without reservation — and I joined the cabinet.

GERMANY capitulated toward the end of April, and shortly thereafter I presented a complete analysis of the Nazi collapse to the Emperor, who asked me numerous questions on the subject. I told him that the air war had been one of the major factors responsible for GERMANY’s defeat, pointing out at the same time that the raids on JAPAN were becoming heavier and heavier, that production had slumped so alarmingly as to render continuation of the war a virtual impossibility, and that our future policy would have to be formulated in the light of these conditions. His Majesty replied that he would like to see the war ended soon. It was merely a casual remark on his part, nor was I in any position to state the views of the Cabinet, but, at any rate, I could see that he desired an early peace.

The next clear indication came in connection with the matter I discussed yesterday, so I shall have to repeat myself briefly. You will remember that certain decisions had been reached at the meetings of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War held between 11 and 14 May. It had been agreed that the Premier would report to the Emperor on the meetings, but on 15 June, in the course of the conversation with KIDO, I learned that his Majesty had never been told anything about them. I asked SUZUKI whether or not he had spoken to the Emperor, who seemed to be incomplete ignorance on the subject, and he replied that he had not got around to doing it.

Accordingly, when I saw the Emperor on 20 June, I told him about the Supreme Council for the Direction of War meetings and reported in detail on what we were doing to sound out the USSR through ex-premier HIROTA as a move toward peace. His Majesty was highly pleased, expressing the hope that the talks could be expedited and a general peace quickly achieved. He went on to say that, despite the earlier decisions taken by the Supreme Council for Direction of War, the reports made by the Chief of the General Staff and Gen. HASEGAWA after their inspection trips to various places had convinced him that our preparations, both in CHINA and in JAPAN, were so extremely inadequate as to render it absolutely essential to end the war without delay. He said that he realized it was far from an easy task, but that he hoped we would take steps to stop the fighting as soon as possible. His Majesty expressed himself at great length on this subject.

Pointing out that the overall military situation was an extremely important factor in connection with any peace effort, I told him that, at present, JAPAN was in such an unfavorable position that would be all but impossible to obtain advantageous terms, but that I would devote myself heart and soul to the realization of his desire for an early conclusion of hostilities. I was able to grasp the Imperial wishes fully in the course of this lengthy conversation.

On 22 June the Emperor called in the leaders of the Government and the High Command to impart his wishes to them simultaneously. According to the Japanese Constitution, the Government and the High Command were, as you know, two entirely separate things. There were co-ordinating organs, such as the Liaison Conference and the Supreme

Council for the Direction of War, but only the Emperor stood above both. I interpreted the simultaneous summons on 22 June as a move toward unity and harmony on the part of the Emperor.

Setting aside legal considerations, the practical situation was as I have indicated. That is, while talking to KIDO around the middle of June, I had mentioned the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, saying that I was very much inconvenienced and annoyed by its sudden meeting and strongly worded decision, complaining that the Navy, while ordinarily frankly admitting that the war could not be continued, never took a definite stand at such conferences, and stressing the need for getting together in our thinking. KIDO had replied that, in view of the current military situation, it would have been natural to expect the Army and Navy to call for an end to the struggle, but that they appeared utterly incapable of doing so. Since the Emperor wanted the war ended at once, he had added, the time was ripe for a major change in direction based on a command from the Throne; in short, we should ask the USSR to act as a go-between in peace overtures. I had then said that, as the Premier had doubtless informed him, the Russian possibility was being discussed by the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, to which he had replied that SUZUKI had said nothing about it either to him or, as far as he knew, to the Emperor. It was in this way that, as noted previously, I learned that the matter had not yet been reported to his Majesty. At any rate, to return to the Imperial summons on 22 June; this earlier talk with KIDO concerning the necessity of concluding an early peace may be feel that the Emperor had probably issued the summons at KIDO’s suggestion.

At the meeting the Emperor stated that the nation was beset by difficulties at home and abroad, that the military outlook was exceedingly gloomy, and that the situation was certain to deteriorate as a result of the increasingly heavy air raids, for all of which reasons he desired that those present, while going ahead on the one hand with the operations decided upon at the recent Imperial Conference, do their utmost on the other to end the war as quickly as possible. The Premier replied that we would do our best to conform to His Majesty’s wishes, after which the others, who had been assigned places in the order of their precedence at court, spoke in turn. Adm. YONAI said that some study had already been given the matter, mentioning the agreement reached by the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War as a result of their conferences between 11 and 14 May, and I took up this story in detail, repeating what I had told the Emperor on the 20th. I warned that it would be somewhat risky to work through the Russians, that we would have to make it worthwhile for them if we expected to use them, and that we would need to be prepared to pay as substantial price.

UMEZU, the Chief of the General Staff, spoke next, pointing out that any peace proposal on our part would have such profound effects both at home and abroad, that it would have to be handled with the greatest prudence and the fullest regard for existing circumstances. The Emperor asked whether his statement meant that he was fundamentally opposed to the idea of a peace move, to which UMEZU replied that he was not; that he meant only that extreme caution would be required. The Emperor then retired.

OI: What did the Minister of War and Adm. TOYODA, Soemu, say?

TOGO: I don’t remember what either of them said, I don’t think they said anything very important.

OI: About this meeting on the 22nd — am I correct in understanding that those present included no secretaries, just the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War?

TOGO: That is not exactly correct. The Supreme Council for the Direction of War was supposed to meet in the Imperial presence; formally speaking, those present at a regular meeting, such as the one on 8 June, would include the Emperor, the Council members, and various secretaries. The term was commonly used, however, to refer to meetings held without the Emperor; i.e., meetings attended only by members and secretaries. To make the distinction clear, the expression “meetings of the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War” was employed. When a regular meeting in the Imperial presence was to be held, the Emperor was notified accordingly by the Premier and the two Chiefs of staff. No such procedure was followed in the case of the 22 June meeting, which was not a Council meeting as such, but I think it is correct to say that, in selecting top men from the Government and the High Command for the audience, the Emperor used membership in the Council as a guide.

OI: Didn’t the Emperor say anything about Russian mediation?

TOGO: No. As I noted earlier, KIDO mentioned it, but the Emperor did not.

OI: When the Emperor discussed his desire for an early peace did he say anything about peace terms?

TOGO: No, not at that time.

OI: Let’s go into the suspension of the Hirota-Malik talks.

TOGO: As to how much faith we had in the talks — I did not feel very sanguine over the outcome because, as I said yesterday, we could not expect the Russians to be very kindly disposed toward JAPAN; if we wanted to obtain their services as mediators, we would have to feel them out, soften them up, and finally overcome their opposition completely. The first thing HIROTA did was to explore their attitude by talking to their ambassador early in June on topics of a general nature. MALIK showed great interest in the improvement of Russo-Japanese relations, promised to report the conversation to MOSCOW, and expressed a desire to begin concrete talks as soon as he received instructions to do so. HIROTA reported that the outlook was very hopeful, and I encouraged him to go ahead as fast as he could.

The two met a couple of times afterward at dinner parties, but the talks did not show much progress. I pressed HIROTA to speed things up and find out whether or not the Russians were really interested, since we would have to consider other measures if they weren’t. HIROTA remonstrated that it was a bad idea to give them the impression that we were in a great hurry, but I pointed out that, while what he said was true enough from the standpoint of normal diplomatic tactics, haste was absolutely vital in this case. I think HIROTA did make efforts through various channels, but the Russians did not respond, and the talks were broken off until the 24th. On the 22nd, I called on HIROTA in his home in KUGENUMA, told him in detail of the Emperor’s wishes as they had been made known by His Highness at the audience on the 22nd, and asked him to do his best to make some progress with the Russians. The result was a meeting on the 24th.

OI: Why was HIROTA selected for the conferences with MALIK? Was it

the purpose of the HIROTA-MALIK talks to sound out the Russian attitudes unofficially in accordance with the decision to negotiate reached by the Supreme Council for the Direction of War in mid-May?

TOGO: That is correct. Our purpose was to sound out their attitude, to improve relations between the two countries, and to invite mediation for general peace.

HIROTA was selected partly on account of things that had happened earlier. There had been much criticism in TOKYO of JAPAN’s negative policy vis-à-vis the SOVIET UNION, and immediately after the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet, when as I told you yesterday, Gen. UMEZU came to see me about keeping RUSSIA out of the war, he went so far as to say that I had better consider what to do about the ambassador to the SOVIET UNION. During such a critical period, however, it would have been extremely difficult and costly to replace our ambassador; we could not afford to waste the month which a change would consume.

As the idea of a special envoy had been tried without success toward the end of the Tojo Cabinet and again during the tenure of the Koiso Cabinet, the prospects in that direction were not encouraging, but it was thought that if, by any chance, we should send a man to MOSCOW to outrank Ambassador SATO, the logical choice was HIROTA, a senior statesmen, a former premier, at a man who had been in the SOVIET UNION before and would be able to get to work immediately upon arrival. I put the case to HIROTA himself very frankly, whereupon he told me that he could not see his way clear going to the SOVIET UNION, but that he would be glad to work for better Russo-Japanese relations in JAPAN. Adding that he was convinced that something should be done, and that he had repeatedly said as much to key men in the Government during the tenure of the preceding cabinet, he asked me not to hesitate to call on him if he could do anything at all to help in JAPAN. In view of that statement, and in view of the fact that, as things stood, HIROTA was the best man available, we asked him to take on the talks

OI: He was given an official assignment by the Foreign Minister, but what was his actual status? He was not an advisor to the Foreign Minister - - -.

TOGO: He was not am advisor, of course, nor was he a representative of the Foreign Minister. If you want a name for the talks, you might call them unofficial conversations.

OI: MALIK was the Soviet Ambassador. What was HIROTA’s position?

TOGO: I told HIROTA to tell the Russian Ambassador that he was acting with the knowledge of the Government, and HIROTA began the talks with that understanding.

OI: Let’s go on to Question No. 9.

TOGO: The instructions transmitted on 12 July had to do with the Imperial desire to send Prince KONOYE to the USSR.

OI: It seems telegram was sent late at night.

TOGO: Since the Hirota-Malik talks had made little progress, I began to feel extremely doubtful about the sincerity of the Russians and the likelihood of their embarking on direct negotiations. In

order to definitely ascertain the attitude of the Moscow Government, I sent a telegram to Ambassador SATO to inform him that I had asked HIROTA to conduct conversations with MALIK with a view to improving our relations with the USSR, and ultimately, with other countries, and to instruct him to ask the Moscow Government to co-operate with us in expediting the negotiations.

OI: There was an acrimonious dispute between Home Minister ABE and the Chief Cabinet Secretary around 6 July over the question of the National Volunteers; the cabinet record shows that the question of organizing the National Volunteers was discussed daily around 6, 7, and 8 July. The telegram seems to have been sent about that time. Is that correct?

TOGO: The organization of the National Volunteers was being discussed at that time, but the telegram which I just mentioned was not submitted to the Cabinet for approval. I talked it over with the Premier, of course, but since there was nothing new about it in the way of diplomatic policy it was not submitted to the cabinet. There ought not to be any record of it in the cabinet Journal

OI: The journal mentions the National Volunteer question. It may be that SAKOMIZU remembers it because he learned about it through his position as Chief Cabinet Secretary, but he says that he thinks it was submitted to the Cabinet. Perhaps you, as the Foreign Minister, told the cabinet about it?

TOGO: I talked to the Premier about it, but I did not show him a copy of the telegram. I wondered how much SAKOMIZU knew about it . . .
He quite likely heard about it from the Premier.

OI: This is about Premier SUZUKI. It says in KIDO’s diary that when the Premier was received in audience on 7 July, the Emperor reminded him that he had said he was going to sound out the Russians and asked him what had been done.

TOGO: I meant to talk about that later, but I might as well do it now. Since the Russians showed no disposition to go ahead with the matter (I was told that MALIK had reported on his talks with HIROTA by courier instead of by telegram), I felt we might as well forget the whole thing; I talked to the Premier and other members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War and got them to agree that we would have to try another approach, and that the only feasible move was to send a man to the USSR.

On 2 July I was received by Prince TAKAMATSU. I told him that the military situation made it imperative to seek an early peace, that both the Army and the Navy were strongly in favor of doing so, that we had no alternative to seeking Russian mediation, and that, in my opinion it would be advisable to send an emissary to MOSCOW. Saying that YONAI had told him the same thing, the Prince asked me whom I had in mind, and I replied that I thought Prince KONOYE was the man for the job. That was on 2 July.

I discussed KONOYE with the Premier, and on 7 July (I remember distinctly because it was TANABATA Day) I went to KARUIZAWA for an unofficial talk with KONOYE. I saw him on the 8th, told him that I was very anxious for him to go to MOSCOW, and said that I had consulted the Premier that had not yet reported to the Emperor. KONOYE agreed to go if the Emperor so directed, adding that he felt a deep sense of personal responsibility in connection with the China Incident,

the Japanese-American negotiations, and the other developments which had culminated in the present situation. He then asked about peace conditions, to which I replied that the subject was being discussed at meetings of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War attended by the members only, but that the trouble was that the military always insisted officially that JAPAN was not defeated. I said that I thought the only course open to us was to try for anything at all short of unconditional surrender. KONOYE replied that he was of the same opinion and asked to be given carte blanche as to terms if he went to RUSSIA. I agreed that it might be best not to make any decisions in advance.

So the confidential talks went on.

Returning to TOKYO from KARUIZAWA on the 8th, I went to see the Premier, who informed me that the Emperor had called him in to tell him to expedite the peace talks. He said he had replied that he would do so upon the return of the Foreign Minister, who had gone to KARUIZAWA to see Prince KONOYE. I reported KONOYE’s opinions and desires and arranged to have the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War called together at once.

OI: According to an American source, the Emperor received KONOYE on 12 July, privately instructed him to agree to any terms which the Emperor himself could conceivably accept, and told him to communicate the terms directly to him by telegram. The Konoye Memoirs contain the same story.

TOGO: That episode may be described in the Konoye Memoirs, but there was nothing secret about it. I told Premier SUZUKI before leaving for KARUIZAWA that I would obtain KONOYE’s informal consent and suggested that SUZUKI indicate to the Emperor the desirability of an Imperial command. SUZUKI readily agreed, and I assume that he did so before the Emperor saw KONOYE

Arrangements were made for Konoye to be received by the Emperor when he came to TOKYO for the Japan-China Association inauguration ceremonies on 12 July. KONOYE told me about the audience when we met at the ceremonies, and I later took him to the Premier’s official residence so that the three of us could discuss the matter in detail. KONOYE said that the Emperor had asked him how he felt about going to MOSCOW on a peace mission, that he had signified his approval of the idea, that the Emperor had then specifically requested him to go, and that he had agreed to do so. He added that a formal command would probably be issued later, and that he hoped it would not contain rigid instructions concerning the peace terms, since such restrictions would hamper his work in MOSCOW. I told him that I shared his opinion.

At the time, KONOYE did not say that the Emperor had told him that any conditions would be acceptable or that his Majesty had asked him to communicate with him directly, but I understood that he makes such a statement in his memoirs.

OI: I didn’t bring KONOYE’s suicide message today, but it definitely makes that statement.

TOGO: Prince KONOYE probably did write something of the sort. When I talked to him in KARUIZAWA, he mentioned that he wanted to go without being bound by terms, and I recalled that he told me later that the Emperor had given the idea his general approval.

Let’s go on to Question 10.

It having been more or less settled that KONOYE was to go, I made a complete report on developments to date before the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War on the 14th, at the same time stating that I had sent a telegram to MOSCOW on the night of the 12. No objection was raised, but the matter of peace terms remained to be settled. The Premier expressed the opinion that some consideration should be given both to terms and to the selection of the Princes entourage, and it was decided to send along the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, a general and an admiral. When it came to a discussion of peace terms, the War Minister, pointing out that, whereas JAPAN still held large areas of enemy territory, she had lost only IWO JIMA and OKINAWA, and that, from an overall viewpoint, she was not losing the war, repeated his contention that we must formulate our conditions on the basis of these facts. The Navy Minister and I replied that the peace conditions should take cognizance of the entire military situation, with particular emphasis on probable future developments, but the debate became so heated that at length YONAI, whispering to me that the conference would break up if the point was pressed too far, suggested that we talk about it some other time. In view of the further circumstances that KONOYE had asked for a free hand, there was no more discussion of peace terms that day, and in the end the matter rested there; all agreed that substantial concessions should be made to the Allies through the USSR, but no concrete decision was reached. In other words, the decision was postponed until after KONOYE had talked to the Russians in MOSCOW.

OI: Did the Council meet on the morning of the 14th?

TOGO: I can’t remember whether it met in the morning or in the afternoon.

OI: Ambassador SATO reported to the Foreign Minister by telegram from MOSCOW that the Russians refused to negotiate because they didn’t understand what terms were being proposed.

TOGO: It wasn’t the terms they didn’t understand: it was KONOYE’s mission.

OI: Didn’t the Russians indicate that they could not act as mediators unless JAPAN agreed to unconditional surrender?

TOGO: It was SATO’s personal opinion that unconditional surrender was the only possibility; I don’t think the Soviet Government ever told him so.

OI: Didn’t SATO’s telegram contain anything but his own opinion?

TOGO: What it contained was not the opinion of the Soviet Government; the Russians had not said any such thing. It was SATO’s own opinion. I told SATO that we could surrender unconditionally without Russian assistance, but that we were not prepared to do so; I recommended that he spend more time in working on the USSR and less in sending me such telegrams.

OI: It says here, “KONOYE also testified that when SATO was sounding out the Russians, he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.

TOGO: The procedure for unconditional surrender was simple; it would not have entailed sending KONOYE. No one in TOKYO at that time agreed to unconditional surrender. I am not aware that Ambassador SATO’s recommendation of unconditional surrender had any great influence on the Emperor. What document is that?

OI: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

TOGO: I believe it is wrong on that point.

OI: Let us proceed to Question 11.

TOGO: While we were engaged in our various maneuvers, the heads of the three Allied Powers met at POTSDAM. Before the meeting took place, it had been my intention to inform BRITAIN and AMERICA of our desire to end the war in the hope of dissuading the Allied Powers from unconditional surrender and obtaining some sort of terms which would enable us to conclude a peace, but on the 26th, before there had been time to pursue this course, the Potsdam Declaration was proclaimed. My immediate reaction was that the terms set forth therein were the best JAPAN could hope for, the war situation being what it was. As I had occasion to mention yesterday, however, the Cairo Declaration and its contradiction to the Atlantic Charter had to be taken into account, because it was a distortion of historical fact to regard the Sino-Japanese War as a war of aggression. Moreover, if RUSSIA adhered to the Potsdam Declaration, the disposition of Southern SAKHALIN would become an issue, which, in turn, would open the whole question of the Russo-Japanese War. A Brief History of the Russian Communist Party points out that RUSSIA’s policy of aggression was one major cause of the Russo-Japanese War.^{You can find the text he refers to here.} That is to say, even the Russian interpretation is that the Russo-Japanese War was an outcome of the struggle in MANCHURIA between the conflicting capitalist activities of JAPAN and Czarist RUSSIA. It is absurd to condemn JAPAN for having waged a one-sided war of aggression. Hence the inconsistency.

My second reaction was that, since the Potsdam Declaration covered a wide field, if we were to accept it, we would first have to make sure that various points in it would be interpreted to our advantage. While it would be extremely impolitic to reject the Potsdam Declaration, to accept it at once, as it stood, would be equally inexpedient. As I said, I felt that we should negotiate with a view to clarifying some of its aspects. And also, since, until then, we had been in contact with the Russians, I felt that we should press our efforts in this quarter.

TOGO: On the morning of the 27th, I presented my opinion before the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, asserting that it would be extremely impolitic for Japan to reject the Potsdam Declaration, and that, if possible, we should try for negotiations and, at the same time, wait and see what would come of our efforts vis-a-vis the USSR.

Some members of the council were of the opinion that we should reject the Potsdam Declaration outright, but as JAPAN was in no position to do so, it was finally agreed that we would withhold comment for the present and await further developments. A similar decision was reached at the cabinet meeting that afternoon. Nevertheless, the papers on the following day reported that JAPAN would ignore the Declaration. How this happened to be printed I do not know. I took strong exception to the report, my point being that ignoring

the Declaration was vastly different from withholding comment for the time being, which had been the decision reached by the cabinet and the Supreme Council for the Direction of War. That day happened to be the day that the cabinet ministers and the High Command met at the Palace to exchange information, but as urgent business called me elsewhere I did not attend. In the course of this meeting, the top leaders of the High Command and the Government gathered in a separate office apart from the conference room and the military insisted that the Premier state definitely through the press that the Potsdam Declaration would be ignored. The Premier agreed to do so, with the result that it was reported widely that the Premier had explicitly stated at a press conference that JAPAN could not accept the Declaration and would ignore it. I protested that this step was in direct violation of the cabinet decision, and that not even the Premier could set aside or violate a decision of the cabinet. The explanation given me was that the Premier was also very concerned, but that it had been decided to leave it at that for the time being, as to issue a retraction would be very awkward. Thus a grave mistake was made, of which the consequences were to prove extremely disadvantageous to JAPAN. President TRUMAN declared that the UNITED STATES dropped the atomic bomb on HIROSHIMA because JAPAN had rejected the Potsdam Declaration, and RUSSIA likewise justified her entry into the war by saying that JAPAN’s rejection of the Declaration left her no alternative but to join the Allies. However, within the Japanese Government, at least to my knowledge, there was never any decision to reject or to ignore the Potsdam Declaration. I have heard that Premier SUZUKI has admitted that he handled the situation very badly.

OI: In An Account of the War’s End, which I understand was written by a YOMIURI reporter, it is said that Premier SUZUKI was obliged to give in to the insistence of the military.

TOGO: It would seem that the military were so insistent that the Premier had to yield. SAKOMIZU so reported and that was the explanation I was given when I protested. In the meantime, the atomic bomb was dropped on HIROSHIMA. On the 6th.

OI: Going back to the Cairo Declaration, I believe SAKOMIZU said that while the Cairo Declaration speaks of the unconditional surrender of JAPAN, the Potsdam Declaration refers only to the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces; that the Foreign Minister stressed this point, claiming that the Potsdam Declaration followed the Cairo Declaration with regard to the territorial clause but did not stipulate the unconditional surrender of JAPAN; and that the Foreign Minister opposed rejection of the Potsdam Declaration, basing his contention on the ground that the Declaration demanded only the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces.

TOGO: That is still my conviction. The Cairo Declaration stipulates the unconditional surrender of JAPAN, but the Potsdam Declaration provides for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces only; it makes no mention of the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. Moreover, neither the official communication of 13 August nor the Allied reply of the 14th uses the term "unconditional". Both employ the phrase "surrender of JAPAN." The surrender of JAPAN--as opposed to that of her armed forces--was therefore conditional, the conditions being those laid down at POTSDAM. The Potsdam Declaration reads, "The following are our terms," and hence, I contend that the capitulation of JAPAN was not unconditional surrender.

OI: This is the point that you stressed at the time?

TOGO: Yes--with the provision that since, as I said before, the wide range of the document left much room for interpretation, it was my desire to seek clarification to our advantage.

OI: And by what means, diplomatic or otherwise, did you hope to accomplish this?

TOGO: I thought that negotiating through RUSSIA was the only way.

OI: Do I understand then that JAPAN could not accept the Declaration at once without first studying the situation with a view to enlisting Russian aid and discovering what interpretation could be made?

TOGO: Of course the situation would have to be studied if we were to negotiate through RUSSIA. But the point is we had already asked the USSR for mediation and she had not yet explicitly declined our request. We on our part had instructed our Ambassador to meet directly with MOLOTOV. It was not that we were studying the situation, but that we wanted to wait and see how things would develop, at least until we received a reply from the Russians.

OI: That is, you wanted to see what the Russian reply would be like?

TOGO: We were not studying ways and means of clarifying the Declaration.

OI: You were not studying ways and means, but you hoped to clarify matters through continued negotiation with the SOVIET UNION?

TOGO: If the SOVIET UNION were to have acted as a mediator, we would have been able to broach the subject to the Allies.

OI: Please go on to Question No. 12.

TOGO: Oh, yes, about the atomic bomb. The wording of the question seems to imply that the Foreign Minister should have made some sort of recommendation to the Emperor or the Cabinet as soon as the bomb was dropped. Whether such was the intention of the writer or not, this is a good chance for me to point out a few things. In the first place, since the atomic bomb was purely a military matter, it was not up to the Foreign Minister to report on it; it fell within the province of the ministers of the armed forces, and, to the extent that domestic affairs were affected, of the Home Minister. Reports to the Supreme Council for the Direction of War were likewise the responsibility of the military ministers and the High Command.

To go into the matter a little further, the Japanese system of government differed from that of such countries as the UNITED STATES in that decisions concerning war (i.e., whether to declare war, whether to make peace, etc.) Were not the exclusive responsibility of the Foreign Minister. I do not mean simply that it was the Emperor who declared war and made peace, although that is, of course, true, but that the Foreign Minister was not his Majesty’s sole advisor. The Emperor acted only on the unanimous opinion of the Premier and other Cabinet members, representing the Government, and the two Chiefs of staff, representing the High Command. Since the supreme command was, as you know, overwhelmingly influential in JAPAN, it always submitted its opinions independently of the Cabinet, and the two opposing stands were reconciled in the Imperial presence. No war was ever started or ended except by decision of an Imperial Conference attended by the High Command and the Government. This is a fundamental rule. The point of all this explanation is that it is a serious mistake to say that the Foreign Minister was the responsible official when it came to starting or ending the war. I think you yourselves understands the situation correctly, but many people do not.

To get back to the subject, I learned about the atomic bomb from an American broadcast received by the Foreign Ministry. I got in touch with the Army immediately, and they told me that, although the Americans were claiming to have dropped an atomic bomb, it might actually have been an extraordinarily destructive conventional bomb. They added that the matter needed to be examined more closely, to which I replied that they had better hurry up because foreign countries were attaching a great deal importance to the new development. On the next day, the 7th, there was a meeting of the Cabinet ministers concerned, at which, if I remember correctly, the Ministers of War, the Navy, Home Affairs, and Transportation were present. I reported that the American radio was saying that the atomic bomb would revolutionize

modern warfare and that more bombs would be dropped on Japan unless she sued for peace. The Army tried to minimize the effect of the bomb by repeating that we were not sure that an atomic bomb had been used and insisting that we wait for the investigation reports.

In view of the intensified propaganda barrage from the UNITED STATES, I went to see the Emperor the following morning to give him the information we had obtained from American and British broadcasts and impress him with the urgency of the situation; I told him it was being said abroad that the bomb would revolutionize not only modern warfare but society and the daily life of the ordinary individual as well, and that it would continue to be used against JAPAN until she surrendered. The Emperor indicated clearly that the enemy’s new weapon made itimpossible to go on fighting. I said that we should lose no time in ending the war, to which His Majesty replied that I was quite right, told me to try to end the war immediately, and requested me to convey his wishes to the Premier.

I went to see the Premier at once to ask him to call a conference of the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, but we were obliged to postpone the meeting until the following day (i.e., the morning of the 9th) because some of the members were not available earlier. The SOVIET UNION entered the war against JAPAN on the 9th.

OI: In his statement, Mr. SAKOMIZU said that the Foreign Minister stated mildly but clearly at the Cabinet meeting on the 7th, that JAPAN should accept the Potsdam Declaration at once.

TOGO: I said that the introduction of a new weapon which had drastically altered the whole military situation offered the military ample grounds for ending the war, and that we could consider a peace move based on the Potsdam Declaration, but I could not get the others to agree. As I said before, the Army men were still doubtful about the bomb, and I was not in a position to tell them to drop their investigations and end the war immediately.

OI: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey says, “On the morning of 7 August, the Premier and the Foreign Minister conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor.” Should that be the 8th?

TOGO: I was not received in audience with the Premier on the 8th.

OI: It says, “On the morning of 7 August SUZUKI and TOGO conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor, stating that this was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The military faction still, however, could not make up its mind to accept it.”

TOGO: Before I was received in audience on the 8, I went over the same ground with the Premier, pointing out that, despite the denials of the Army, foreign reports insisted that the new weapon was an atomic bomb, and adding that it was essential to take action to cope with the situation immediately. I then went to the Palace.

OI: You reported to the Emperor that it was time to accept the Potsdam Declaration?

TOGO: Yes. On the 8th, I stated explicitly what I had advocated all along, and the Emperor agreed that the new weapon had made it impossible to go on fighting. I suppose that, as the supreme commander viewing the problem from other than its purely political aspects, His Majesty felt that the atomic bomb made continuation of the war not only a political but also a tactical impossibility.

OI: At one time you wanted to ascertain the exact meaning of the Potsdam Declaration through the SOVIET UNION. Did you now feel that there was no time for that?

TOGO: That is correct. In the face of the mounting crisis, we were unable to do as we wished. Strictly speaking, our intention had not been solely to get the USSR to clear up ambiguities in the Potsdam Declaration; we wanted to ask her to convey our intentions to the Allies and perhaps to arrange a meeting between Japanese representatives and an American-British delegation.

OI: At any rate, the idea was that the time had come to accept the Potsdam Declaration, whether through Russian mediation or directly. The conditions set forth in the Declaration were to be made the basis for ending the war.

TOGO: That is correct.

OI: Let us go on to Question 13.

TOGO: Question 13 concerns Russia’s entry into the war. Before dawn on the 9th, I was notified by the radio operator at the Foreign Office that RUSSIA had declared war on JAPAN and invaded MANCHURIA. I went immediately to call on the Premier, who had been bombed out and was living in his private home in KOISHIKAWA. SAKOMIZU was there too. I reminded the Premier that I had asked him to call together the members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War at once to discuss the atomic bombing of HIROSHIMA the day before and added that I felt it more urgent than ever now that it decision be made to terminate the war immediately. The Premier agreed and promised to take the necessary action promptly.

Thinking I should inform the Navy Minister, I called at his office on the way back to the Foreign Office. YONAI agreed readily to my suggestion that it was high time we made up our minds. In the corridor, I ran into Prince TAKAMATSU, who asked me to step into his office for a minute. I did so, and, in answer to his request for news, told him that the sudden turn in the military situation left us with no alternative to outright acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, with the reservation that the structure of the state be preserved. TAKAMATSU asked if something could be done about the territorial clause, to which I replied that, as I told you yesterday, I thought it violated the Atlantic Charter, and that I had made several efforts to enter into negotiations with the Allies on that point, but that it was too late for negotiations now; that, unfortunately, there was nothing to do but accede to the territorial demands. I left him with assurances that I would do my best to achieve a better settlement if the opportunity arose.

The members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War met at 1100 hours. Reporting on the latest developments, I stated at some length that, since the present situation was so critical

as to preclude all hope of victory. I felt it essential to sue for peace and accept the Potsdam Declaration immediately, that, since the welfare of the Imperial Family must be secured at all costs, we must obtain a guarantee in that respect, but that, since the recent attitude of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA and the USSR indicated that they would reject our proposals outright and refuse to negotiate further if we attempted to exact a large number of concessions, we should reduce our conditions to a bare minimum. YONAI supported my position, but the other military chiefs — the War Minister and the two chiefs of staff — wanted to impose additional conditions. While agreeing that the position of the Imperial Family and the structure of the state would, of course, have to be guaranteed, they maintained in addition that we should either eliminate the security occupation of the main Japanese islands entirely or at least exclude TOKYO and restrict the number of troops employed and the locations occupied to a minimum; that the disarmament of troops should be left in Japanese hands; and that war criminals should be tried by Japanese tribunals. I told him that I, too, would favor those conditions if there were any possibility of their acceptance, but that, in view of the Allied attitude, we would have to face a general breakdown of the negotiations if we were to submit them. I asked whether we could expect to win the war if the peace talks collapsed, to which they replied that, although they were not certain of ultimate victory, they were capable of one more campaign. I then asked whether they believed they could ward off an invasion of the homeland, and the army chief of staff replied that, if we were lucky, we could repulse the invaders before they landed, but that all he could say with assurances was that we could destroy the major part of an invading army; that is, that we could inflict extremely heavy damage on the enemy. I pointed out that some of the enemy would succeed in landing despite heavy casualties; that a second landing could be expected to follow in due time; that in the first landing JAPAN would lose airplanes and other vital weapons which she would not be able to replace in a short time and, therefore, would be practically powerless even if the Allies should not use the atomic bomb; that, disregarding any casualties the Allies might suffer, our Government’s relative position would then be far worse than at present; and that the only thing to do under the circumstances was to try to end the war at once, presenting only those peace conditions which were absolutely essential. All in all, it was an extremely heated discussion, but it accomplished nothing. No decision had been reached by a little before 1300 hours, at which time the Premier adjourned the conference until after the Cabinet meeting scheduled for the afternoon.

The Cabinet meeting was a repeat performance of the morning’s discussion. War Minister ANAMI and I went over the same arguments, neither convincing the other, until finally the Premier asked each minister to state whether or not he concurred with the opinion of the Foreign Minister. A majority did, but some did not; others could not make up their minds.

Since the cabinet was unable to agree, the Premier asked me to go with him to submit a joint report to the Emperor on the course of the discussion to date. We left the meeting and went to the Palace, where at the Premier’s request, I gave His Majesty a detailed account of the progress of the debate. The Premier then requested that the Supreme Council for the Direction of War be called together for an Imperial Conference; the Emperor approved, and

a meeting was called immediately.

At the Imperial Conference, I repeated the argument I had presented at the Supreme Council for the Direction of War that morning. ANAMI, UMEZU, and TOYODA said they could not agree with me; the Navy Minister and President HIRANUMA of the Privy Council, who had been asked to attend, supported my view. In view of the fact that we had found it impossible to reach a unanimous opinion, Premier SUZUKI then asked the Emperor for his opinion. His Majesty stated that he agreed with the Foreign Minister, that the military had frequently made statements contrary to fact, as, for example, reporting that certain plans had been completed when such was actually not the case; that he had lost confidence in the military’s predictions of future success; and that it was necessary to bear the unbearable and end the war in order to save the country. The Council thereupon decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the reservation concerning the safeguarding of the national polity, and, at the evening Cabinet meeting, a similar resolution was passed in accordance with the Imperial decision.

The reservation was whittled down by the Cabinet to a request for security of the Imperial Family and a message was dispatched to the allies through SWITZERLAND and SWEDEN.

OI: A while ago you said that Navy Minister YONAI agreed to your proposal immediately. Did he dissent on the morning of the 9th?

TOGO: I recall that the Navy Minister supported me readily on the morning of the 9th. Did someone say he dissented?

OI: This is the story. Notes made at the Cabinet meeting held that afternoon indicate that the Navy Minister said he would withdraw the statement he had made in the morning at the Supreme Council for the Direction of War and henceforth support the Foreign Minister. There is no reference to the remark in other notes taken at the meeting, nor does SAKOMIZU remember anything of the sort.

TOGO: That cannot possibly be. As you know, no shorthand record is made of Cabinet meetings. Certain persons may take down notes, but they are not always accurate. I do not recall hearing YONAI make such a statement. At the morning conference, he agreed with my view that we should limit our peace conditions to a minimum. Nothing he said needed to be retracted; I think somebody must have misunderstood him.

OI: Let’s go on to Question 14.

TOGO: It’s hard to judge psychological reactions accurately, but I think I can say on the whole that my confidence was unshaken all long. I had felt for some time that the general situation made it necessary to sue for peace regardless of how harsh the conditions might be. The Potsdam Declaration made the conditions clear, and various persons both inside and outside the government agreed that we could not expect anything better. Moreover, I knew that I could win most of the Cabinet over to my way of thinking, and I was confident that I could get them to support me at a Cabinet meeting. The military used strong language at conferences, but, as I mentioned earlier, they refused to say that they were confident of ultimate victory. ANAMI and I clashed

frequently toward the end, but there were no unpleasant scenes

To digress for a moment, after the Cabinet meeting on the 14th, which lasted from morning until almost 2400 hours, ANAMI, who had been seated at the far end of the table, came to me and said with the utmost amiability that he had seen the draft of the telegram concerning the security occupation and demobilization which I have promised to send to the Allies, that he approved of it wholeheartedly, and that he would not have argued with me during the day if he had seen it earlier. This telegram ....

OI: May I interrupt you for a minute? Is this the last long “solicitation” telegram you sent out on the 15th?

TOGO: You could call its contents solicitations; they were not conditions. It asked for such things as the exclusion of TOKYO from the zone of occupation and the limitation of the size of the occupation army to a minimum and for Japanese handling of demobilization, an arrangement which, we suggested, would be convenient for both parties. I sent a draft of the message, which I had talked over with the War Minister at the start, to the Army and Navy on the 14th. When ANAMI and I met, he thanked me warmly for preparing such a splendid draft and said that he would ask nothing more than for me to send it. I told him that, as I had said earlier, we were not presenting conditions but merely submitting a list of JAPAN’s desires. He thanked me again for my cooperation and reported agreeably. I noticed that he was being extremely polite, but I little expected him to commit suicide the following morning. ANAMI and I had been intimate ever since the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet. After the atomic bombing of HIROSHIMA, we had talked alone together over dinner for six hours at his official residence, and he had nodded in agreement in response to my statement that JAPAN’s defeat would be only a matter of time if the Americans succeeded in landing and establishing a beachhead. As a result of such conversations, I knew that ANAMI and the others were convinced that it would be simply a matter of time once the allies landed; not a single person was opposed to acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration in principle. I had done everything to make sure that there would be no opposition; I feel that, had it not been for my painstaking preparations, peace would have been most difficult to attain — in fact, the grave complications and disturbances which would have ensued might have prevented the conclusion of peace altogether.

Another thing I should mention is that, as a result of my experience in the Tojo Cabinet, I had reached an understanding with the Premier at the outset, which fact taken together with our subsequent conversations, may be confident that he would come to my support in the end. Furthermore, since the problem involved the destiny of the nation and directly affected the security of the Imperial Family, the Emperor was far more interested in it than in ordinary state affairs, and I knew that he was very anxious to have peace. I can say that, in the light of these circumstances, I was confident of my ability to hold out against the die-hards and eventually gain my point with them. As it turned out, however, I was unable to keep the military from insisting to the very end that they were not beaten, that they could fight another battle, and that they did not want to end the war until they had staged one last campaign. I could understand how they felt; they were sure that they could deal a punishing blow to the American invaders in one last battle, and they were reluctant to

drop all their preparations and sue for peace when they knew they could do so — or perhaps even repulse them completely. The fact that the military were saving face by insisting that they had not been defeated also made it useless to argue with them. The difficulty of winning over all the members of such a group was so apparent as to make it likely that, in the end, no agreement would be reached, in which case, if there was no hope of a Cabinet reorganization, we would have to ask for an Imperial decision. I think I can say that, despite the complications involved, I scored a success in prevailing upon a majority of the Cabinet to support my views while at the same time continuing to oppose the military. One can also say, perhaps, that the Emperor’s decisions on the 9th and the 14th would have been hard to make if the groundwork had not been laid — or, conversely, that the decisions were rendered relatively easy by the fact that a majority of the Cabinet members supported the Foreign Minister.

As to when I considered the situation most critical, the 9th was a bad day. The Supreme Council for the Direction of War met in the morning, there was a Cabinet meeting in the afternoon, and an Imperial Conference was called in the evening. It was on that day that we argued about whether to accept the Potsdam Declaration with a single reservation concerning the security of the Imperial Household or whether to attach three other conditions, and it was also on that day that the basic decision was reached. I had to fight all day long, but it was on that day that our future course was charted.

We found out on the 12th what the Allied reply was going to be; the communication was officially received on the morning of the 13th but we heard it over the radio on the 12th. It was reported to the Emperor before noon, and discussion was resumed at an extraordinary Cabinet meeting in the afternoon. The military (since it was a Cabinet meeting, this meant War Minister ANAMI) argued that the reply was not satisfactory; that we should make further inquiries with regard to the protection of the national polity and that we should, at the same time, present as conditions the previously shelved issues of disarmament and occupation. In opposition to this proposal, which received some support, I said that to add further conditions to the one previously submitted concerning the security of the Imperial Household would be highly improper and could only be interpreted by the Allies as an indication of JAPAN’s intention to break off the negotiations; that to revive a proposal which had been thoroughly debated on the 9th and ultimately dropped by Imperial decision was to show disrespect for the decision of an Imperial Conference; and that to attempt to keep on fighting, in the face of the Imperial decision against continuation of the war, by raising issues which would mean the collapse of the negotiations was to act in a manner contrary to reason — a manner to which I was irrevocably opposed.

I might add in connection with what KIDO told you yesterday, that for some unknown reason, the Premier said on that occasion in very strong terms that the Allied reply was unsatisfactory, that to be disarmed by the enemy would be unbearable for a soldier, and that under the circumstances there was no alternative to continuation of the war. Needless to say, I was very much disturbed. Replying that what the Premier had said was worthy of careful consideration, but that we should not continue the war irresponsibly without regard to the outcome — that unless there was some prospect of victory we should turn to peace negotiations —

I succeeded in getting the meeting to adjourn by proposing that we postpone further discussion until we received the formal reply.

OI: Was the argument for continuation of the war made at the cabinet meeting?

TOGO: Yes. I spoke out against it in the manner I have just described, and immediately after the meeting I told the Premier in another room that I disagreed with him, that the disarmament problem had already been settled and it was absurd to take it up again, and that we could not take a strong stand on any issue unless there was some prospect of winning the war. Adding that I could not understand why he was talking about continuing to fight when even the Emperor was of the opinion that the war could not go on, and that if he insisted on the point I would report to the Emperor alone, I left the room. I realized, however, that if I spoke directly to the Emperor it would indicate disunity among the Cabinet and might result in serious complications, so I told KIDO instead. I believe KIDO described the incident to you yesterday.

OI: KIDO said the dispute concerned preservation of the national polity, not disarmament.

TOGO: It was said at the meeting both that the Allied reply regarding the preservation of the national polity was unsatisfactory and also that it was unbearable for a soldier to be disarmed by the enemy alone; two issues were raised, and, as I told KIDO, I was put in a tight spot. I spoke to KIDO because I thought the situation would be aggravated if I informed the Emperor directly. KIDO said that the Emperor had already made up his mind, and that he, KIDO, would speak to SUZUKI. Immediately thereafter, KIDO told me that the Premier understood the situation and was willing to go ahead on the basis of the Allied reply; that he was not the sort of man to oppose the Emperor’s will.

My task then was to win over the military leaders, although I knew from the outset that I would be successful only to a certain extent. My strategy was to gain my point by persuading a majority of the Cabinet, including the Premier, to agree with me. If the Premier changed his mind, I would be checkmated, and insistence on my point in the face of growing support for continuation of the war would result in the forced resignation of the Cabinet, which, in turn, at that crucial moment, might well mean not only loss of the present opportunity but increased agitation against termination of the war, serious internal disorders, and an end to all hope of peace. There was, therefore, definitely a crisis on the 12th. I still can’t understand why SUZUKI said what he did at that time.

From the 12th on, the young officers in the Army grew increasingly restive, and there was talk of a coup d’état to protect the Emperor. Around the beginning of July, I had said to YONAI that we would have to be prepared for disorder when we began to talk about peace — that we would have to be ready from the outset to risk our own lives, but that, at the same time, we would have to take measures to quell disturbances before they got out of hand. He had replied that he could mobilize troops from YOKOSUKA, and, in answer to a question regarding possible opposition within the Navy, had said that, as Navy Minister, he would, if necessary, discharge trouble-makers. In the light of this interchange, I asked YONAI to be on his guard when signs of trouble appeared on the

12th. The Home Ministers views were so radical that we did not consider him dependable, so we issued a warning to be on the alert directly to MACHIMURA, the chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, who had earlier gone to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs MATSUMOTO to ask him to expedite the peace negotiations in order to prevent disorder. There were signs of activity among the military from the 12th until the evening of the 13th — the situation was threatening until around the 14th — but fortunately nothing serious happened. The police increase the number of men guarding me.

On the evening of the 14th a small number of soldiers caused some confusion in the palace but were unable to start a large-scale riot. Although our lives continued to be in danger from dissident elements, we felt after the 14th that the crucial moment for a coup d’état or general uprising had passed. I heard later that ANAMI had been opposed to those displays of violence, but that circumstances had rendered him powerless to prevent them. If there had actually been a coup d’état, the peace negotiations would have been blowing sky-high, but fortunately we were spared such a development.

A second Imperial Conference, attended by all Cabinet members and the two chiefs of staff, was held on the 14th. This was not the same as a Supreme Council for the Direction of War meeting. In accordance with the precedent established in the time of President HARA, whereby the President of the Privy Council customarily attended such meetings, HIRANUMA was requested by the Emperor to attend both the earlier Imperial Conference and this one.

Since we had debated the issue exhaustively on the 12th and 13th, the Premier began by stating to His Majesty that it was the opinion of the Foreign Minister that, although the Allied reply was not entirely satisfactory, it could, on the whole be said to accept our position, that there was no prospect of obtaining more favorable terms through continued negotiation, that, in view of the present international situation, any new demands with respect to the occupation and disarmament would endanger the security of the Imperial Household, and that we should immediately accept the Potsdam Declaration. He added that a majority of the Cabinet agreed, but that a few ministers and a few members of the High command did not, and he then proposed that the Emperor hear the opposing view — that only the dissenters present their case. The reason for this was of the Emperor had, of course, been kept informed as to how things had developed in the meetings of the Cabinet and the Supreme Council for the Direction of War; I myself had been received in audience to report on what had been happening.

After listening to the opposition view, the Emperor stated that his determination to accept the Potsdam Declaration had not changed since the previous Imperial Conference, that unless we bore the unbearable and accept it at once the national polity would be destroyed and the Japanese people exterminated, that he supported the Foreign Minister’s opinion, that the dissident elements in the Army to which ANAMI had referred should be made to understand the situation, and that he desired that an Imperial Rescript be prepared to make his wishes clear.

A cabinet meeting followed at once, and at 2300 hours an

Imperial Rescript was promulgated.

OI: There is not much time left. Was there any possibility that Gen. ANAMI might resign during the crisis?

TOGO: Yes, there was. We thought he might resign and cause the Cabinet to collapse. The Premier, SAKOMIZU and I once talked about it and agreed that we should be prepared for such a development.

OI: Were you afraid ANAMI might resign and cause the collapse of the Cabinet when he came out so strongly in favor of going on with the war?

TOGO: As I said earlier, I often exchanged views with the general, and I knew him fairly well. He thought that sooner or later it would become impossible to continue the war, and that we would then have to accept the enemy’s conditions, however severe. He was in a position in which he had to give due consideration to the honor of the Army, and, moreover, he was forced to take a relatively strong stand because he could not completely ignore his subordinates, some of whom held extremely positive views and were engaging in maneuvers of various kinds, but I believe he understood the situation very well at heart. I think it was for this reason, plus the fact that the Emperor wanted an early peace, that he did not cause the collapse of the Cabinet or support a coup d’état.

OI: In other words, you knew how ANAMI felt at heart because of talks you had had with him.

TOGO: I did not think he would go so far as to wreck the Cabinet or support a coup d’état.

OI: You do not worry or sense danger?

TOGO: No, I did not. The situation was critical, but I was confident that there was some way out.

HARA: By “understand at heart” do you mean that Gen. ANAMI talked strongly but was weak at heart, or that you knew he really wanted to end the war.

TOGO: I mean that he was fairly well convinced that the war would have to end. As I said before, he agreed frankly when I told him I thought it would be only a matter of time once the enemy landed in JAPAN, and I could cite many similar examples. I don’t think ANAMI was an obstinate man.

HARA: It may be that he was forced to speak more strongly than he wanted to by pressure from within the Army. On the basis of your contact with him, would you say that such was the case?

TOGO: He was in favor of peace in principle. He insisted that we propose four conditions, but, in line with the Emperor’s decision, we submitted only the reservation concerning the national polity. I didn’t object to his saying at the last minute that the Allied reply was unsatisfactory is regarded the national polity issue, but I did think it was unreasonable and unlike the ANAMI I knew to try to revive the conditions which had been turned down by the Imperial Conference. I suspected at the time that pressure was being exerted on him by his subordinates.

OI: Weren’t you afraid the Emperor’s abdication might be demanded if JAPAN accepted the Potsdam Declaration?

TOGO: On the contrary, I thought that, in view of the international situation, failure to accept the Potsdam Declaration might mean not only that the Emperor would have to abdicate but that the whole Imperial Family would be endangered. The statement in the Allied answer, based on the Potsdam Declaration, which provided that the ultimate form of the government of JAPAN was to be determined by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people indicated that the Emperor System was not to be abolished, but rather, as was clear to those who knew the Japanese people, that it was to be preserved. If the Emperor System were accepted, it naturally followed that the current position of the Emperor would likewise be accepted. It could be said, therefore, that the Potsdam Declaration accepted the present Emperor’s position in toto; had it not done so, both it and the subsequent reply would have had to be written differently.

OI: The Potsdam Declaration provided that the purpose of the occupation of JAPAN would be to ensure implementation of the peace terms, but Secretary BYRNES subsequently declared that the authority of the Emperor would be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as regarded the execution of occupation objectives. Some of the things you said yesterday and today seem to indicate that the occupation was assuming a form different from the one envisaged in the original promise. We you please clear up this point?

TOGO: The relationship between the Emperor and the Supreme Commander as regarded execution of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration would naturally be as indicated in the Allied reply. If the will of the Emperor and the Japanese Government were not subordinated to that of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the security occupation would be meaningless.

OI: As to the present military government, how would you compare the situation in JAPAN with that of GERMANY?

TOGO: I hesitate to begin a political discussion now, but clearly the present security occupation under the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration differs from the occupation of GERMANY. From the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese Government was allowed to continue functioning as a government, the sole reservation being the right of the Supreme Commander to rescind or countermand any act of the Japanese Government which he deemed inconsistent with the Potsdam Declaration. This, I believe, is the purpose of the Potsdam Declaration and the subsequent Allied communication.

As to Question 15, it might be said that the danger of assassination constituted an obstacle, but since I had been resolved from the outset to risk my life in the struggle, it is unnecessary to dwell on that point.

The first obstacle, then, was the assertion of the military that they had not been defeated and that they were still capable of continuing the war and inflicting heavy losses on the Allies. In this connection, I think you may be interested to know that, at their request, I met the two chiefs of staff at the Premier’s residence on the night of 13 August. We had a lengthy discussion,

chiefly about the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, but nothing was said that had not been said before. ONISHI, the Vice-chief of the Naval General Staff, came in while we were talking and asked to speak to the two chiefs of staff. He contended that the problem in question was not that the Allied reply was unsatisfactory; the need, he felt, was rather for the military to formulate a plan for certain victory, submit it to the Emperor, and then proceed to carry it through. He strongly urged the two chiefs of staff to adopt this course, arguing that we would never be defeated if we were prepared to sacrifice 20,000,000 Japanese lives in a “Special attack” effort. This idea was shared by some of the top men in the Operations Department. The military were convinced that, at the very least, they could still deal a heavy blow to the Allies, and inasmuch as they were actually laying plans to intercept the invasion forces and inflict heavy losses on them, there was nothing we could say to dissuade them. I pointed out that even if we could inflict heavy losses on the Americans in their first landing attempt, we would also suffer losses, and that, since we could not replace the armament lost, we would be the ultimate losers. The assertion that we were not defeated and that we could still continue the war seriously hindered our peace efforts.

Another obstacle, one raised outside JAPAN, was the increasing propaganda about unconditional surrender. This hampered our peace efforts to a very great degree.

OI: Going back to the middle of May, when Russian mediation was first considered, were the three points, i.e. to maintain Russian neutrality, to utilize Russia to your advantage and to get her to mediate, prepared in advance between you and the Premier as an agenda for discussion?

TOGO: They were not prepared in advance as subjects for discussion, but the talk developed and crystalized around them.

HARA: At the time the Suzuki Cabinet was formed, Premier SUZUKI stated that the war could be continued for two or three more years, and on 13 August he argued in favor of continuation of the war. Do you think, then, that he followed one consistent policy from the formation of his cabinet to the end the war?

TOGO: To put it simply, I think he felt that the war had to be ended as quickly as possible and hence that he was thinking of peace. But I do not believe he realized the extent to which our war potential had deteriorated or anticipated that the military crisis would develop so rapidly. I think he believed he had more time than he had. There is much evidence to show that the majority of senior statesmen shared his opinion — at least up until July. Also, a premier has many delicate matters to handle. It may be that occasionally he was obliged to say things he did not mean. Although he may have been vacillating at times, I believe I can safely say that his determination to conclude an early peace remained unchanged.

(End)

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

Translation Requested by Historical Section

Date Rec’d ATIS 17 Aug 50

Description Of Contents: Full translation of statement by former
Foreign Minister TOGO.

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Stated by: TOGO, Shigenori. (Former Foreign Minister).

Stated to: J. FOREST, Y. NAKAMURA, and OI, Atsushi of G-2
Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

Date: 30 Jan 50 (Monday).

Place: Sugamo Prison.

Subject: Recollections of the Events on the Eve of the Surrender.

1. Attitude of Army Leaders toward Efforts to End the War.

I entered the Suzuki Cabinet in April 1945 as Foreign Minister, where I began to work for the earliest possible termination of the war. War Minister ANAMI and Chief of the General Staff UMEZU never showed an opposition to my starting peace efforts. In the middle of May the regular members of the Supreme War Direction Council exclusively met and agreed upon the diplomatic measures to be taken towards the SOVIET UNION. These measures contained a clause requesting the SOVIET UNION to mediate in the ending of hostilities. In other words, the six members were agreed in principle on ending the war. It can be said that the fact that such a meeting was held and such an agreement was reached at that time was because War Minister ANAMI and Chief of the General Staff UMEZU inwardly desired the end of the war. When I met these two generals individually and talked over various matters with them in April, I was even then able to see that both of them were quite concerned over the necessity of terminating the war. The reason why I reached the decision for holding this conference of the six in mid-May was because I had been able to learn to a certain extent the true feelings of these two highest leaders of the Army.

If the opportunity for Japan to surrender had passed us by in mid—August 1945, it would have invited a grave situation, and I believe that it can be said that the reason the surrender was carried out at that time with such a minor confusion was that an understanding in principle about the termination of the war had already been reached among the six. In other words, I believe that the fact that an agreement had been reached in mid-May was one of the biggest reasons why the army was kept from offering drastic opposition to the termination of the war when we proposed the surrender in August.

However both ANAMI and UMEZU advocated terminating the war only after obtaining, once at least, some sort of favorable war result. For instance, I often told ANAMI that the idea of carrying out a crucial battle on the Japanese homeland should be abandoned, but he never accepted my opinion about this matter. Though these two army leaders unreservedly accepted the principle of ending the war as soon as possible, they held fast to the attitude of not ending the war in defeat. War Minister ANAMI’s advocacy of having a crucial battle on the homeland in the meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council and in the Cabinet Meetings was especially strong. I was unable to judge how much of this was based on their own natures, deliberations and beliefs. In August I had a very frank, private talk with War Minister ANAMI, we talked over the suitability of having a crucial battle on the homeland. I felt that his opinions at that time were quite flexible. One of the reasons why he strongly opposed my opinions at official meetings

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was probably that both of us were somewhat on edge as we faced the grave situation of deciding about the surrender. However, I never felt ill toward ANAMI or UMEZU. This is because I had no doubt that, despite our heated arguments, we were agreed on the basic idea that the war must be ended.

2. The Proceeding of the Big-Six Conference Held In Mid-May, 1945.

This meeting was held without any prearranged topic of discussion. It was held merely with a view to harmonize the six men’s opinions on the basic war policy through such a frank discussion as might be impossible if other persons were present. To my mind the most basic problem was an early realization of peace, but this problem was not taken up at the beginning of the meeting. Further, no one brought any written proposal for the discussion. Definite conclusions were gradually reached as the meeting proceeded for three days on the 11^th, 12^th, and 14th of May. Immediately after the meeting was over, I draft a report of the points agreed upon by the six persons, and got it signed by the six. This document was burned when the Foreign Ministry building was destroyed in an air raid in late of the same month. I immediately rewrote the document the day after the fire while I still clearly remembered the contents and the phrases. At this time I had it inspected by the Prime Minister alone and put it into custody after having been signed by the Prime Minister and myself. When Adm TOYODA replaced Adm OIKAWA as Chief of the Naval General Staff, I made a copy of the document and handed over to the new naval chief of staff at his request. This copy is the one you are using now.

Now, at the opening of the six men’s meeting UMEZU voiced the following opinion:

“The SOVIET UNION has recently been busy moving troops to the FAR EAST. The Army is keeping a vigilant eye on this, but it cannot fully prepare fur operations on both the Pacific and Manchurian fronts. Therefore, diplomatic measures to keep the SOVIET UNION from participating in the war against us are believed to be most necessary.”

No objection was voiced by anyone to this. If I remember aright, Navy Minister YONAI or his naval colleague then proposed that more positive diplomatic measures be taken toward RUSSIA. He said that diplomatic negotiations should be conducted to have the SOVIET UNION supply JAPAN with war materials, especially petroleum. I immediately refuted such arguments by saying that the SOVIET UNION itself was short of oil and was supplementing its own supply with shipments from the UNITED STATES, especially so in the Far Eastern regions. It would be impossible for the SOVIET UNION, which was in such a position, to supply oil to JAPAN unless it sacrificed its ties of friendship with the UNITED STATES. In view of the war situation at that time in both the east and west there was no hope of success even if such unrealistic demands had been made to the SOVIET UNION.

To this, Navy Minister YONAI replied, “A well–known, elderly diplomat has stated that there still is hope for such diplomacy to succeed.” With Adm YONAI I was in a very close accord on an early ending of the war and there was no necessity for me to argue with him either before or afterwards. But on this particular occasion we argued so hotly that it is still vivid in my memory. Adm YONAI by nature, was a man of very few words and was a person who would state his final conclusion without too much explanation. It was

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that way at that time. However, I saw hear a good opportunity to expound to my colleagues my cherished idea. Explaining the world situation in general, I stated in considerable detail that now that the war situation for JAPAN had become steadily worse, there was no hope of getting the SOVIET UNION to adopt a favorable attitude toward JAPAN. Thus JAPAN should, I concluded, immediately begin to make an effort to end the war.

At this juncture Prime Minister SUZUKI made the following statement:

“As the Foreign Minister has stated, the opportunity perhaps has already passed to get the SOVIET UNION to adopt a favorable attitude toward JAPAN. But it would be unwise for us to make no diplomatic move to RUSSIA. Let’s do something. And if the world situation is as the Foreign Minister states, how about asking RUSSIA to mediate for peace? STALIN seems to be like SAIGO, Takamori, (TN: A foremost general in the MEIJI Restoration, and of generous and indulgent personality.) and I believe he will make every effort if we ask him.”

I did not agree with his views on STALIN, but I was happy that the statement by Prime Minister SUZUKI created a very excellent base for our initiating peace move. Therefore, I immediately said “Analyzing our discussion up to now, the following can be noted:

1. Prevention of the SOVIET UNION’s entrance into the war against us.

2. If possible, to induce the SOVIET UNION’s neutrality to be benevolent toward JAPAN.

3. Also, to ask the SOVIET UNION to mediate the peace between JAPAN, and the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.

I believe that the conference on the 11th and 12th of May ended at this point. We did not meet on the following day, the 13th because it was Sunday, or for other reasons. The meeting was resumed on the 14th with the same six persons attending. I was the first one to speak in the meeting of the 14th.

“I think that the SOVIET UNION has not forgotten that we in the past have taken a very unfriendly attitude toward her assuming our potential enemy No. 1. I am sure the SOVIET UNION is not willing to see us remain a powerful neighbor. Therefore, if we intend to try to approach the SOVIET UNION now, I think we must be ready to offer her radically great concessions. I think the greatest cause for the failures of the Koiso and Tojo Cabinets in their SOVIET approach was that they hesitated in supplying anything of sufficient attraction. However, a radically great concession on our part is not necessarily a sure solution. Since the war situation today is steadily growing worse, such radical concession on our part will involve more dangers than would have been offered by the previous cabinets. The reason is that if we do so, the SOVIET UNION will judge that JAPAN has become desperate and, as a result, there will be a chance that the SOVIET UNION will move in the opposite direction from that which JAPAN wants.”

After this, a discussion was held over the compensation to be given the SOVIET UNION. It may seem rather strange but the six agreed without any confusion on this problem. Then I stated, “Now

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that the compensation to be given the SOVIET UNION has been agreed upon, I think our asking the SOVIET UNION to act as a peace mediator will be greatly facilitated if the peace conditions to be submitted to the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN through the SOVIET UNION are decided upon at this time.”

Thereupon, War Minister ANAMI made the following statement:

“While JAPAN is still occupying large areas of enemy territory, the enemy has invaded only a small area of Japanese-owned territory. Thus we must keep this fact in our view in discussing the peace conditions to be sent to the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN. We must not base our discussions on an assumption that we are proposing peace because we are being defeated.”

I was surprised at the War Minister’s statement and refuted it “If the mediation requested of the SOVIET UNION is based on such conditions, the negotiations are sure to fail. The War Minister is insisting that under the present situation, JAPAN is still winning. But such contention will be disregarded in this type of negotiation. The discussions of the peace terms should be carried on in consideration of the future trend of the war situation, not just from the present situation.”

As the atmosphere of the conference became tense over the dispute between the War Minister and me, Navy Minister YONAI intervened, “Let’s leave this subject for a while.”

At that I immediately sensed that Adm YONAI is suggesting this in the thought that the results of the three days of Conference Meetings would be nullified if the discussion became confused. Therefore, I withdrew my last proposal. Thus, the meeting of three days came to an end.

The aforementioned contention of War Minister ANAMI that “JAPAN is not being defeated in the war” did not change even later. He stuck to the same contention at the meeting of the Supreme War Direction Council held on 18 June. Again, similar contentions were held by the War Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff on 14 July when the matter of the peace conditions came up for discussion among the six after the decision to dispatch a mission headed by KONOYE to the SOVIET UNION had been made. For this reason, although I asked the SOVIET UNION to act as a peace mediator, I was unable to advise her of our peace conditions in any concrete form. Incidentally, I had made an understanding with Prince KONOYE that his negotiations with STALIN over the peace conditions were to be based on KONOYE’s own judgment. But such understanding was made necessary in view of the fact that there was no alternative because of the Army’s attitude.

3. The Peace Approach through SWEDEN.

I became Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet on 9 Apr 45. Two days later (11 April) Mr. SAKAYA visited me and told me roughly the following:

“The Swedish Minister, Widar BAGGE, has been mentioning that he is returning to his country in the near future and that he could ask the Swedish Government to sound out the intentions of the American Government on peace for the sake of JAPAN. Moreover,

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he states that he intends to do it on his own volition and not at the request of the Japanese Government.”

I told Mr. SAKAYA immediately that I was all for the idea and requested him to tell Mr. BAGGE that I would like to meet him personally.

Mr. SAKAYA called on me on the following day with Mr. BAGGE’s answer that he was very happy when my words were transmitted to him, and that he could not find time to meet me become was the departure of his airplane was expected any moment. Mr. BAGGE left JAPAN by airplane on the following day, the 13th.

Days later I received a telegram from OKAMOTO, Suemasa, Japanese Minister in STOCKHOLM. The telegram stated that Mr. BAGGE called on OKAMOTO and informed him that if formally requested by the Japanese Government the Swedish Government would be glad to sound out the peace intentions of the American Government. I do not remember the exact date, but I believe the day I read the telegram was sometime after the aforementioned conference by the regular members of the Supreme War Direction Council in mid-May. I wondered somewhat at the words, “if formally requested by the Japanese Government”, because it was different from what I had heard from Mr. BAGGE in April. Furthermore, I never heard from SHIGEMITSU (the foreign minister of the KOISO Cabinet), nor from Prime Minister SUZUKI (who took over the Foreign Minister’s position from SHIGEMITSU), anything about the fact that Mr. BAGGE and former Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU negotiating over this matter.

In any case, I do not believe the affair of Mr. BAGGE has any important historical value. When I became foreign minister, the military, the Imperial Court, and the political circles were generally agreed that the SOVIET UNION was the only country which could be asked to mediate for peace if such a request was to be made. This agreement was based upon the opinion that the SOVIET UNION was the only neutral country which could persuade the UNITED STATES to reconsider its stand that JAPAN surrender unconditionally.

I personally did not favor the policy of seeking Soviet mediation, but I was forced to agree to use the SOVIET UNION because of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Swedish Government to take up the mediation problem voluntarily was discovered, and because the lack of the Swedish Government’s power to effect the reversal of the UNITED STATES’ stand on JAPAN’s unconditional surrender was clear, while Japanese sentiment at the time did not permit the acceptance of unconditional surrender.

Furthermore, two more obstacles existed to the use of the Swedish Government as a means of mediation. The first was the fact that the rumor was spreading in European diplomatic circles that JAPAN had requested the Swedish Government for peace mediation, and the second was the fact that full co-operation between Minister OKAMOTO and the military attaché to the legation was thought difficult.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

Translation Requested by G-2, Hist

Date Rec’d ATIS 17 Jan 50

Description Of Contents: Full translation of statement made 28 Nov
49 by ex-Foreign Minister TOGO, Shigenori.

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Statement by: TOGO, Shigenori, ex-Foreign Minister

Statement made before J. FOREST, YAMAZAKE, Tosuke, and OI, Atsushi.

Time: Forenoon of 28 Nov 49.

Place: 361 Station Hospital.

Subject: Recollections of the War’s End.

Question: Who was the first to mention the four conditions at the Supreme War Direction Council meeting of 9 August? According to the recollection of TOYODA, Soemu, the Prime Minister made the first move and announced that the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was inevitable. This was followed by a long moment of absolute silence, after which YONAI, Minister of the Navy, brought up the four conditions for debate. Is this correct?

Answer: To say that the Prime Minister opened the discussions or submitted the proposal is incorrect. I was the one who urged acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, after explaining the various circumstances.

After the atomic bomb had been dropped on our country, the Army insisted on waiting for results of investigations to determine whether or not the above bombing was done with an atomic bomb. While formulation of countermeasures was thus being delayed, the SOVIET UNION joined in the war against us. I, therefore, urged that, more than ever before, the war must be ended. I informed the Council members of the words of the Emperor, who had said that as long as the atom bomb had made its appearance, continuation of the war had become impossible. After prefacing my arguments with the above statements, I proposed that the Potsdam Declaration be accepted.

Each member agreed that it was imperative to propose to the Allied Powers to guarantee the Imperial Household as a condition to the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. However, I do not remember that the four conditions were voiced particularly by Minister of the Navy YONAI, since various individuals had been of the opinion that in case our conditions were to be presented at all, these would generally be the same as the said four conditions. Besides the above four conditions, I had in mind a matter of grave importance, namely, the territorial problem. However, I withheld mentioning it because I felt that this would further complicate our argument; it was never mentioned by the others, either. I then suggested, “Conditions should be as few as possible and limited to matters of absolute necessity.”

Discussions started with this proposal of mine as a basis. No one opposed acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration in principle. However, as mentioned above, it is certain that various individuals were thinking of some conditions requisite to acceptance of the Declaration. As the discussions progressed, these conditions came up for debate one by one. I cannot specifically recall who broached what condition, but, if I remember aright, it was not en bloc by the same person that all of the four conditions were introduced. Try as I might, I cannot recall that Minister of the Navy YONAI introduced all the four conditions. Moreover, what I do remember also differs from what is stated in Toyoda’s memoir in respect

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to the fact that he did not advocate all of the three conditions but supported only one or two of them. My recollection is that ANAMI, UMEZU, and TOYODA all maintained a common stand. Since ANAMI strongly advocated the three conditions during the afternoon session of the cabinet meeting again, he and I clashed sharply.

Question: According to a joint study made of all available reports, such as the statements made by ex-Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUMOTO, as well as the Foreign Affairs Ministry records, you were told by MATSUMOTO after the conclusion of the cabinet meeting on 12 August: “Although a formal reply from the Allies is expected to arrive at any moment during this evening, let us pretend that it had arrived the morning after, and conduct the affair accordingly. As for tonight, please go home and rest.” Shortly thereafter, at 1840 hours, the Allied formal reply was received. Still, it was distributed under the pretense that it arrived the morning after, at 0740 hours, and every member believing this to be the correct time of arrival, the discussions on peace were held. Such is the case as it is known, but what are your recollections on the matter?

Answer: Until now I was under the impression that the formal reply came the morning of the 13th. However, since vice-minister MATSUMOTO states that it was received on the evening of the 12th, and the documents of the Foreign Ministry corroborate this, the correct time probably was the evening of the previous day. In any case, I do not think the question has any great importance, for I was of the opinion that the informal Allied reply which was received over the radio during the morning of the 12th, could not be too different from the formal reply.

Further, there was already a cabinet discussion based on this. The opinions of each cabinet minister were made known through this discussion. It was enough for us to decide our policy in accordance with this result. True, I led the cabinet meeting to be adjourned with no decision reached. But it was only because Prime Minister SUZUKI showed a vacillating attitude at the cabinet meeting. The premier’s vacillation convinced me that the discussion had better be suspended for the time being. I, therefore, proposed that the cabinet meeting be adjourned until receipt of the formal reply. But I made the proposal not because I expected the formal reply would convey me any novel contents on which I could develop a better argument. Immediately after the cabinet meeting I sharply warned SUZUKI that unless the reply of the Allied nations was accepted unconditionally it would most probably mean a continuation of the war, and that the continuation of the war would not only run against the Emperor’s wishes but lead to destruction of JAPAN.

I was sufficiently aware of Prime Minister SUZUKI’s position as an arbitrator to show adequate sympathy for the views of the opposing party, as well as for the insistence of the military, in order to prevent them from revolting. Nevertheless, it was a moment when he had to proceed firmly with his conviction. Therefore, I went to the extreme of saying that “if you continue to hold such an attitude, I may be compelled to report to the Throne regarding my own convictions.” Nevertheless, I thought it was adequate to have Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO talk to him rather than go so far as to report to the Throne. I asked KIDO about this that evening. Words to the effect that SUZUKI had obligingly consented were communicated to me over the telephone by KIDO the same night,

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and so I was relieved.

Question: As one of the initial Japanese reactions to the Potsdam Declaration, Prime Minister SUZUKI made at a press conference a statement which later produced grave results. Will you please explain the circumstances which caused him to issue this statement?

Answer: When the Potsdam Declaration first reached JAPAN, the Chief of the Naval General Staff asserted, at the exclusive gathering of the regular members of the Supreme War Direction Council, that an announcement should be made to the effect that JAPAN flatly rejected the Allied Declaration. I opposed his contention; I said that serious results might arise if we should openly reject the Declaration, and at the same time insisted to wait a while longer in order to determine RUSSIA’s attitude, for she had been asked to mediate in our behalf. Basing its stand on my opinion, the Government, too, decided at the cabinet meeting to make public the Potsdam Declaration but to refrain from commenting upon it. The following day, 28 July, was a Saturday when, as regularly, a meeting to exchange information was held during the morning hours at the Imperial Palace to have the High Command explain to the cabinet members on military situations. I did not attend this meeting because I had other pressing business. But I heard later that due to strong request by the Naval General Staff insisting to reject the Declaration by means of an Imperial edict, a separate conference was held on that occasion among the Prime Minister, ministers of both the Army and the Navy, and the chiefs of the Army and Navy general staffs, and that as a result of this discussion they arrived at the conclusion that it would not be harmful for the Prime Minister to simply say, “The Declaration will be ignored.” Hence the statement at the press conference was made.

Question: A study of the history covering the surrender period gives us an impression that you were foremost in firmly taking the initiative. Progress or stalemating of the peace movement depended on either your activity or inactivity. In comparison, Mr. SUZUKI took very uncertain attitude, which may have been due to his old age. Could you explain this matter?

Answer: Looking at it from the point of view that SUZUKI, as Prime Minister, had to act as an arbitrator, it frequently appeared that he must have thought it necessary to show a sympathetic attitude toward the opinions of the uncompromising elements. SUZUKI’s hesitation, however, was of no great historical importance. As has been stated previously, the fact that he showed hesitation did not alter the course of history.

I worked for the peace resolutely because I had SUZUKI’s understanding of my intention, which I had made clear to him at the time of my entering the cabinet. It was my firm determination to effect a peace, regardless of the obstacles that might lie ahead. In contrast with the above, at the time when I became a foreign minister before the outbreak of the war, the situation had already aggravated to the point where nothing could be done to save it from calamity. The war, I believe, could not have been avoided, even if someone else had been in the post of Foreign Minister. As for the termination of the war, the fact that the peace was effected at such an early time, was due, I am sure, to my devoted efforts as Foreign Minister. Above all, however, I could hardly suppress my feeling of gratefulness for the courageous and immovable attitude of His Majesty,

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the Emperor, in favor of peace. Indeed, of all those with whom I had to deal at that time, His Majesty was the person most interested in peace. Moreover, that the peace was consummated without any great mishap is due to the influence and virtue of His Majesty.

Further, I may as well add here that recently I had the opportunity to read an article entitled, “Japan was defeated,” in the magazine, SALON. Although it appears as fiction, the story is not entirely unauthentic. It is actually a chronicle. Of course there are in the article some passages which are primarily intended for attracting readers. The part of the story wherein my wife enters into the picture is, so to speak, a sort of entertaining passage, for example. Since my wife was then at KARUIZAWA this is a fabrication. Also, there are in it narratives concerning the conversation between Prime Minister SUZUKI and SAKOMIZU and a considerable number of other incidents which are not familiar to me. Except for these, the article could be considered truly authentic.

The article it seems is undoubtedly based on data obtained from the cabinet. The bad points in the article are that SAKOMIZU is too much in the foreground, and that there are many important instances which are left out because they are not known to SAKOMIZU. The description is, in the main, however, accurate historical fact.