The text below is an excerpt from a MAGIC Diplomatic Summary, one of that series of excerpts from diplomatic communications of enemy and neutral nations (and sometimes allies) intercepted and decrypted by the U.S. and U.K. (i.e., Bletchley Park). As the U.S./U.K. ability to decrypt these messages was one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war, the Summaries were distributed outside the intelligence services only to the highest officials of the American and British governments. Whether President Truman himself read this message is unknown—but it certainly would have been read by his Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy, who would presumably have communicated the gist of it to him. It would also very likely have been read by Secretary of State Byrnes, who commented in his memoirs on the content of another MAGIC DS, and almost certainly also by Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. (Highlights for emphasis are my own.)
The historical importance of this document lies in the fact that it preceded the series of messages generally known as the "peace feelers through the Soviet Union", and put U.S. leaders on notice that in their endeavor to enlist the "good offices" of the Soviets in their effort to get out of the war with as soft a negotiated peace as possible, they were not only moving to bribe Stalin by offering to give up nearly everything Japan had won in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese war, but also to ally themselves with the USSR in the coming U.S./U.K.-Soviet conflict they (and most other astute geopolitical observers) expected to arise within a few years.
Source: RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, NARA, NAID 636254
Declassified by Authority NND957308
MILITARY
1. Japanese attempt to win over Russia:
Early last month Foreign Minister Togo advised Ambassador Sato that it was a matter of the "utmost urgency" not only to prevent Russia from entering the Pacific War, but also to induce her to adopt a favorable attitude toward Japan. Togo continued that he had accordingly asked former Premier Hirota* to confer with Soviet Ambassador Malik "as soon as possible" and that "Hirota will keep a close watch on Soviet tendencies and will try to lead the Russians along the lines we desire" (DS 4 Jun 45).
*Koki Hirota was Premier from March 1936 to February 1937 and has also been Ambassador to Russia (1930-1932) and Foreign Minister (1933-1936, 1937-1938). He was the man Foreign Minister Shigemitsu had in mind last summer when he wanted to send a "Special Envoy" to Moscow, ostensibly to improve Japan's relations with Russia (a proposal which was turned down by the Russians--DS 20 Sept 44).
It now appears that during the period 3-14 June Hirota had four conversations with Malik. A 28 June message from Togo to Sato describing the talks is set forth as TAB A; it discloses that:
a. The first conversation--on 3 June--consisted largely of an exchange of amenities in the course of which Hirota assured Malik that it was "the universal desire" of both the Japanese Government and the Japanese people to have friendly relations with Russia.
b. The next day Hirota was invited to supper by Malik and took the opportunity to state that Japan specifically hoped to "achieve a means of maintaining peaceful relations between the two countries over a rather long period, say 20 or 30 years." Malik made no answer on this point but mentioned that, although Russia had tried to pursue a peaceful policy in the Far East, past events had produced "a feeling of distrust and lack of safety."
c. At the third interview--on 14 June--Hirota pressed Malik for a statement of Russia's reaction to his previous proposal, but without success; he then stated that Japan wished to iron out all sources of friction with Russia and specifically was willing to (1) reconsider Russo-Japanese political and economic relations in Manchukuo, (2) arrive at some agreement on the question of China and (3) supply Russia with commodities from the southern areas. Hirota then inquired directly whether Russia "will consent to reach some agreement with Japan more favorable than the Neutrality Pact, or will improve its currently good relations with Japan, but Malik replied: "Until the expiration of the Neutrality Pact, we shall continue to play the role we have been playing. I can well understand that you would like to exchange views with me regarding our future relations even before the Pact expires. However, our future relations will have to be based on concrete actions."
d. At their last conference that same evening, Hirota stated: " Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that, together with the Russian Army, would make a force unequalled in the world. In this connection, Japan would like to have Russia provide her with oil, in return for which Japan would provide rubber, tin, lead, tungsten, and other commodities from the south (transport would be up to the Russians). Malik replied that Russia had no oil to spare but that he would study the proposal. In conclusion, Hirota stated that Japan hoped for an early peace but "the reply was that, since Russia was not a belligerent in the East, His Excellency Mr. Hirota must be well aware that peace there did not depend on Russia."
[Other unrelated message sections omitted.]
[The following was appended as attachment pages A1 through A7.]
Ref. DS Item MIL-1
28 June Message from Foreign Minister Togo to
Ambassador Sato, Describing Hirota-Malik
Conversations
On 3 June former Premier Hirota called on Ambassador Malik at the Gora Hotel. Hirota opened the conversation by saying"
"It is particularly fortunate that in the course of the present great war Japan and Russia have not gone so far as to hurl defiance at one another, and Russia is deeply to be congratulated that, notwithstanding colossal losses, she finally won her fight [in Europe].
"As far as Japan is concerned, she hopes to maintain the security of Asia in the shifting situation, and is seeking to found this [security] on cooperation with Russia."
Malik replied:
"I am happy that I have been able to carry out my mission under peaceful circumstances in the midst of the present war.
"There used to exist in Japan powerful political forces which were under the influence of many foreign quarters. How is the situation in that respect at present?"
The former Premier answered that [the Japanese] people had been aroused by the arguments for cooperation with Russia--which date back to the time of Prince Ito*--and that at present it was the universal desire among both Government and people to have friendly relations with Russia. In meeting Malik's question, he alluded also to the idea of sending a Special Envoy [to Russia], which had been suggested last year.
*Presumably a reference to Prince Hirobumi Ito, a leading Japanese statesman who at the turn of the century was an advocate of friendly Russo-Japanese relations. In 1901 Ito advocated a settlement with Russia which would give the latter a free hand in Manchuria in return for recognition of Japan's liberty of action in Korea. He did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the Portsmouth treaty (1905) but was blamed by certain Japanese circles for what they regarded as the too lenient terms of that treaty.
II
Malik invited Hirota to supper the next day, the 4th, and on that occasion the conversation was as follows:
Hirota: It would seem that Russia, in addition to devoting every effort to postwar reconstruction and to regaining lost territories in Europe, plans to improve her relations with -----[word missing] countries. I feel that her views with regard to us here are the same.
In this connection, while there is no question about the observance of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Japan hopes for the improvement of relations within the remaining period of the treaty and is, I know, giving thought to the question of what form this should take. I should like to inquire as to what the Russian Government's views on this are, in general.
Malik: Notwithstanding the fact that Russia had consistently and at all times pursued a peaceful policy [in Europe], the recent occurrences took place because Germany was the sort of state she was. Although we have done our best to follow a similar policy in the East, with reference to Japan particularly, we have not been able to achieve our hopes, because there has been a strong opposition of forces. Accordingly, a sort of irreducible sense [of hostility] has remained, and a feeling of distrust and lack of safety has been produced. Is there any concrete plan to dispel this?
Hirota: Since the whole Japanese nation has finally succeeded in interpreting the Russian attitude correctly, it has striven for the basic improvement in the relations between the two countries which is its heart's desire. However, as you have said in the past feelings have not been good, so that we must ----- [word missing] Russia's intentions as to dispelling this.
At the San Francisco Conference, Russia insisted on independence for India, etc. I wish to point out that this and other [similar] points are in the last analysis what Japan is working for. Japan would like to achieve a means of maintaining peaceful relations between the two countries over a rather long period, say 20 or 30 years, while ----- [words missing] but [she is not much concerned] about such formalities as treaties, etc.
Malik then asked whether this was merely Hirota's own view or that of the Government, to which the former Premier replied that he wished it to be regarded as the view of the Japanese Government and people, and went on to say:
"In continuing yesterday's preliminary conversation with you today, I have learned your views more or less concretely. I shall express my own views after studying yours carefully, both as a whole and individually, and I should like to take some time to do this."
Hirota also reiterated that, if the basic questions were settled, naturally other trivial matters would find a solution and that he felt the present to be a golden opportunity for the settlement of basic problems.
III
Because of various circumstances, the next conference was put off from day to day. It finally took place on the afternoon of the 14th.
On that occasion Hirota several times asked about the Soviet views on the proposal he had made during the last interview, but Malik merely kept repeating that he would pass on the proposal made by the former Premier to his Government and ask for its views. Hirota then said:
"The Japanese Government is quite ready to consider the wishes of the Soviet Government with regard to all problems which might in any way prove a barrier to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. To be specific, we are quite willing to consider [a] a modification of Japanese-Soviet political and economic relations in Manchukuo, [b] the arrival at a common point of view on the question of China, and [c] the supply of materials to the Soviet Union from the south.
"It seems to me that, if the Orient is ever to enjoy a genuine peace, our two countries will have to achieve relations based on mutual understanding, If the Soviet Government shares my views on this question, I think that we can easily arrive at an agreement on all problems at stake between us.
"As you know, throughout the world there are those who have no faith in the continued friendship of the Soviet Union for Japan, I would therefore very much like to know if, at this time, the Soviet Union will consent to reach some agreement with Japan more favorable than the Neutrality Pact or will improve its currently good relations with Japan."
Hirota went on in this vein and repeatedly asked Malik about the views of the Soviet Government. The latter part of the conversation was as follows:
Malik: Until the expiration of the Neutrality Pact, we shall continue to play the role we have been playing. I can well understand that you would like to exchange views with me regarding our future relations even before the Pact expires. However, our future relations will have to be based on concrete actions.
Hirota: By concrete actions, do you mean settling our present problems or drawing up specific agreements and pacts?
Malik: Both.
Hirota: My Government will [be glad] to look into any problem at stake between us ----- [words missing].
IV
During a dinner party given by Hirota on the evening of the same day, he said:
"Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that, together with the Russian Army, would make a force unequalled in the world. In this connection, Japan would like to have Russia provide her with oil, in return for which Japan would provide rubber, tin, lead, tungsten, and other commodities from the south (transport would be up to the Russians)."
Malik replied that he would study the proposal although Russia had no margin as far as oil was concerned, and although he assumed the Japanese Army would be opposed to the plan, since it reflected the view of the Navy. (Hirota explained that in matters of national defense there was unanimity of views.)
Since Malik had spoken repeatedly of the fact that Russia was in the process of returning to peace, the former Premier said that Japan too, like Russia, wished to revert to peace quickly. The reply was that, since Russia was not a belligerent in the East, His Excellency Mr. Hirota must be well aware that peace there did not depend on Russia.