No. 584
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 12 1945--11:25 p.m.
VERY SECRET
URGENT

1382. 1. Your Telegrams No. 890 and 891[1#580/#581] were received on the 12th immediately after my reply No. 1381[2] was sent. I take it that the purpose of your telegram was to sound out the possibilities of utilizing the Soviet Union in connection with the termination of the war.

In the unreserved opinion of this envoy and on the basis of your telegram No. 885,[2] I believe it no exaggeration to say that the possibility of getting the Soviet Union to join our side and go along with our reasoning is next to nothing. That would run directly counter to the foreign policy of this country as explained in my frequent telegrams to you. It goes without saying that the objectives cannot be successfully attained by sounding out the possibilities of using the Soviet Union to terminate the war on the above basis. This is clearly indicated in the progress of the conferences as reported in my telegram No. 1379.[2]

Moreover, the manner of your explanation in your telegram No. 891--"We consider the maintenance of peace in Asia as one aspect of maintaining world peace"--is nothing but academic theory. For England and American are planning to take the right of maintaining peace in East Asia away from Japan, and the actual situation is now such that the mainland of Japan itself is in peril. Japan is no longer in a position to be responsible for the maintenance of peace in all of East Asia, no matter how you look at it.

2. Although the Empire and its commanders have said, "We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying," what kind of reaction can we expect when in fact we have already lost or about to lose Burma, the Philippines, and even a portion of our mainland in the form of Okinawa?

As you already know, the thinking of the Soviet authorities is realistic. It is difficult to move them with abstractions, to say nothing about the futility of trying to get them to consent to persuasion with phrases beautiful but somewhat remote from the facts and empty in content. In fact, with reference to your proposal in telegram No. 853,[3] Molotov does not show the least interest. And again, in his refusal he gave a very similar answer. If indeed our country is pressed by the necessity of terminating the war, we ourselves must first of all firmly resolve to terminate the war. Without this resolution, an attempt to sound out the intentions of the Soviet Union will result in no benefit. In these days, with the enemy air raids accelerated and intensified, is there any meaning in showing that our country has reserve strength for a war of resistance, or in sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of conscripts and millions of other innocent residents of cities and metropolitan areas?

3. Concerning these important matters, we here do not have appropriate or accurate information relative to our present armament production and therefore are not in a position to judge matters correctly. To say nothing about the fact that it was only by chance hearsay that we learned of the Imperial Conference which began in early June,[4] at which it was resolved to take positive steps. And, if worse comes to worst and the progress of the war following the conference turns extremely disadvantageous for our side, it would behoove the Government in this situation to carry out that important resolution. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Government might be moved, and the desire to have it mediate will not be an impossibility. However, in the above situation, the immediate result facing us would be that there will be no room for doubt that it will very closely approximate unconditional surrender.

I have expressed my extremely unreserved opinion in the foregoing and I beg your pardon for such frank statements at this time. I have also heard that at the Imperial Court His Majesty is greatly concerned. I find these dreadful and heartbreaking thoughts unbearable. However, in international relations there is no mercy, and facing reality is unavoidable. I have transmitted the foregoing to you in all frankness, just as I see it, for I firmly believe it to be my primary responsibility to put an end to any loose thinking which gets away from reality. I beg for your understanding.

[1]Documents No. 580 and 581, respectively.
[2]Not printed.
[3]Not printed.
[4]The reference is apparently to the imperial conference of June 8. See Butow, Japan's Decision To Surrender, pp.99-101.

No. 586
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 13 1945--10:40 p.m.
VERY URGENT

1385. Re my telegram No. 1383[1].

I immediately requested an interview with Molotov but was told that he was simply not able to accommodate my request and I was asked whether I would convey my message to Lozovsky. Therefore, I met Lozovsky at 5 p.m. on the 13th and conveyed His Majesty's wishes contained in your telegram No. 893[2#582], translated into Russian, addressed to Molotov, and accompanied by my confidential note. I requested further that he immediately transmit this message to Molotov after reading it. The above note included the Imperial wish to dispatch Prince Konoye, mentioned in your telegram, and the request for agreement from the Soviet Government concerning the Prince's visit. Furthermore, in the event of approval, provisions for an airplane and other conveniences were also requested.

Moreover, I mentioned that the special mission on this occasion was absolutely different in nature from those special missions previously proposed to Molotov, as this envoy was being sent in response to His Majesty's personal wish and we would like to have the matter treated accordingly. I further expressed the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain an early answer on this matter, if only a consent in principle, and if at all possible before Molotov's departure, so that the above-mentioned special envoy might be able to meet the Soviet authorities soon after their return from Berlin.

In answer to Lozovsky's question as to which member of the Soviet Government the message was intended for, I said that since it conveyed the Imperial wishes of His Majesty no addressee was designated but that we wished to have it transmitted to Kalinin, Head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Molotov. Lozovsky thereupon stated that he could understand the Japanese Government's hurry for an answer and would try to expedite an answer in accordance with our desires, but he also expressed doubts as to the possibility of an answer before departure time, for one government group was scheduled to depart that very evening. Accordingly, I replied that in the event that an answer was not possible prior to Molotov's departure, we would like him to establish communications directly with Berlin by telephone or other means for their answer, as the special envoy and his suite will require preparations and arrangements. Lozovsky answered that he would naturally handle the matter as above requested and promised to turn my note over to Molotov without delay. I hasten to telegraph the foregoing.

[1]Not printed.
[2]Document No. 582.

No. 587
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 13, 1945--10:40 p.m.
VERY SECRET
URGENT

1386. Re my telegram No. 1385[#586].

Although it may be presumed that the Soviet side this time will agree to the dispatch of a special envoy, it is still difficult to say before receiving the actual reply. In the event that the Soviets agree but the duties of the special envoy are in accordance with your telegram No. 890[2#580], where the purpose was to sound out the limits to which the Soviets may be utilized in terminating the war, or in the event that his duties go no further than abstract explanations as indicated in your telegram No. 891[3#581], they will simply not consider it. It appears from your telegram No. 893[4#582] that His Majesty is deeply concerned about the restoration of peace. Even if we are overawed by the fact that the dispatch of a special envoy is the Imperial wish, if the Japanese Government's proposal brought by him is limited to an enumeration of previous abstractions, lacking in concreteness, you would not only be disappointing the authorities of this country and causing a feeling of great dissatisfaction with the insincere attitude of Japan but would also be provoking trouble for the Imperial Household[???]. I have great apprehensions on this point.

In my humble opinion, as long as the dispatch of an important special mission from afar has been determined, I believe that its purpose should be nothing other than a proposal for peace and termination of hostilities. The Soviets can understand the Imperial wish for peace as reported by this envoy, but they may not find the appointed task of the mission clear and may very well request a supplementary statement. Consequently, although I have no doubt that the special envoy will report the details in person on his arrival, it may become necessary to give a preliminary explanation of the gist of the special envoy's mission in the event that the Soviets request it. At any rate, I would appreciate your answer by telegram. In fact, after ascertaining this point, I believe it is possible to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 893[#582]. Nevertheless, as Molotov's departure time is so near I have not had time to telegraph information to you and I have handled the matter in the manner indicated in the opening paragraph of my reply. However, reflecting on the extremely serious nature of the outline of the proposal which the special envoy would be bringing, I am also thinking of sending a supplementary telegram of my humble opinion for your information after carefully considering the matter.

[1]Document No. 586.
[2]Document No. 580.
[3]Document No. 581.
[4]Document No. 582.

No. 588
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 15, 1945.
VERY SECRET

1392. Re my telegram No. 1386[1#587].

Stalin and Molotov departed from here on the night of the 14th, apparently heading for Berlin. In my opinion this left at least more than half a day to spare before departure, but despite this the Soviets answered that there would be a delay in their reply to my request concerning the dispatch of the special envoy. In view of the fact that a definite answer was not given, it may be assumed that in a matter such as this, which can bring about grave results, the Soviets are avoiding a hasty reply and giving the matter full deliberation. Or it may be that they feel that we are not expecting an urgent reply, which I doubt.

Some reasons which may be thought of for the Soviets' hesitation:

(1) Although they understand the Imperial wish concerning the termination of the war, they lack clarification with regard to the actual mission of the special envoy or with regard to whether or not concrete proposals for the termination of the war are to be presented.

(2) That Japan is proposing unconditional surrender or a peace approximating unconditional surrender would be surprising. But if Japan is thinking of a so-called negotiated peace, there would be apprehension that she is hoping for the good offices of the Soviets for mediation. In that case, it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept.

(3) To avoid disturbing the relations between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union for the sake of Japan at a delicate time when harmony between the three countries is so strongly required.

(4) The need to ascertain the attitudes of England and America before giving Japan a definite reply concerning the matter of the special envoy, as Far Eastern problems are inevitably going to come up in the talks either inside or outside the meetings at the coming Big Three Conference. Or Stalin is ascertaining the intentions of the American and British leaders first, by informing them of Japan's recent request, before replying. If this is so, the attitude of the Soviets will be difficult to determine.

The foregoing are some possible conjectures. Of these, No. 2, with regard to negotiated peace--to conclude a treaty terminating the war by peace negotiations, including the Greater East Asia War--is something which has been strongly rejected from the very beginning by America and Britain and particularly by the former. The Soviet Union was also hesitant regarding such a peace earlier in connection with the unconditional surrender of Germany and even urged Britain and the United States to open a second front, and with this cooperation knocked out Germany. Judging from these circumstances, a peace treaty by negotiation is something which cannot win the support of the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, if our country truly desires to terminate the war, we have no alternative but to accept unconditional surrender or something very close to it.

On the other had, concerning the developments up to the time I read the Imperial wish, your successive telegrams had not clarified the situation. The intentions of the government and the military were not clear either regarding the termination of the war. Furthermore, in a situation where it is finally decided to settle the matter, it should be considered proper at an Imperial conference to pass a new resolution to reverse the decision of the previous conference of June 8th[2]. However, this has not been done, and in connection with notification of the Imperial wish to dispatch the special envoy immediately I feel that the scheduled special mission does not yet have the concrete conditions mentioned in point (1) above.

Even if the approval of the Soviet Union is obtained and the special envoy's visit takes place, I cannot bear to think of the very grave results to which it may lead.

In this regard, after very carefully examining this telegram, my telegrams No. 1382[3#584], and No. 1386, should you finally decide to dispatch the special envoy, I earnestly request that the Cabinet Council resolve to have the envoy bring along a concrete proposal for the termination of the war.

[1]Document No. 587.
[2]See Butow, Japan's Decision To Surrender, pp.99-101. Sato seems to have been unaware of the imperial conference of June 22 (see ibid. pp. 118-120).
[3]Document No. 584.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),
The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945,
Volume 2, pp. 1248-1269 and 1291-1298.

No. 1225
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 18, 1945--11:28 p.m.
VERY SECRET
VERY URGENT

1416. Re your telegram No. 913--2[1#1224-p2]

The so-called unconditional surrender or peace obtained by something close to unconditional surrender referred to in my telegram No. 1392[2#588] and others which I sent from time to time, omits the problem of protecting the fundamental character of our nation. It goes without saying that even in conducting negotiations with the Soviets on the subject of your telegram, the absolute desire on the part of 70 million citizens as regards our form of government should be forcefully stressed. Therefore I have already added a statement in the latter portion of my telegram No. 1143[3#Shuusen Shiroku (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) p. 466], believing that there should be no fear of misunderstanding arising therefrom on this matter; I mention this only in order to make sure.

If the matter of the preservation of our form of government were already taken care of, whether you call it unconditional surrender or whether you call it something close to this condition, in the final analysis it is a matter of degree. As for us I think it should not be made an absolute condition. Concerning the early portion of the telegram I would like to express my humble opinion at another time after giving the matter full consideration.

[1]i.e., paragraph 2 of documentNo. 1224.
[2]Document No. 588, printed in vol. I.
[3]Not printed herein. See Shusen shiroku (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1952), p. 466.

No. 1226
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 19, 1945--2:30 p.m.
VERY SECRET
URGENT

1417. Re my telegram No. 1385[1#586].

On the evening of the 18th I received a confidential note from Lozovsky which reads as follows:

"Moscow, July 18, 1945

"His excellency Naotake Sato, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union

"Excellency:

"I have the honor to confirm that I am in receipt of your note dated July 13, and the message from His Majesty the Emperor of Japan[2#582/586].

"By order of the Government of the USSR, I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that the Imperial views stated in the message of the Emperor of Japan are general in form and contain no concrete proposal. The mission of Prince Konoye, special envoy, is also not clear to the Government of the USSR.

"The Government of the USSR, accordingly, is unable to give any definite reply either as to the message of the Emperor of Japan or to the dispatch of Prince Konoye as special envoy mentioned in your note of July 13.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you my highest esteem. S. A. Lozovsky"[.]

[1]Document No. 586, printed in vol. I.
[2]See vol. I, documents Nos. 582 and 586.

No. 1227
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 19, 1945--4:42 p.m.
VERY SECRET
URGENT

1418. Re my telegram No. 1417[1#1226].

Concerning the matter of the dispatch of the special envoy, the Soviet Government has declined to accept such an envoy for the time being on the grounds that the mission is not specific. The above is indeed regrettable but just as I said in my humble opinion in my telegrams Nos. 1386 and 1392,[2#587/#588] and as again demonstrated this time, there is no way other than to present a concrete proposal when dealing with this government. Although your opinion expressed in your telegram No. 913-2 [913-1][3] has its point from the Japanese side, it does not at all conform to the atmosphere here. That you cannot achieve your objective of having them act in accordance with your hopes can almost be inferred from their attitude in rejecting the special envoy at this time.

[3] This correction was reported in Sato's telegram No. 1429 of July 20[not included]. The reference is to paragraph 1 of document No. 1224.

[1]Document No. 1226.
[2]Documents Nos. 597 and 588, printed in vol. I.
[3]This correction was reported in Sato's telegram No. 1429 of July 20. The reference is to paragraph 1 of document No. 1224.

shuusen kousaku vol 2 p250

No. 1228
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 20, 1945--6:30 p.m.
VERY SECRET
URGENT

1427. Re your telegram No. 913[1#1224].

After considering this matter most carefully, I wish to express my unreserved opinion in the following manner:

1. Since July 14 an American task force has been operating in the waters off the northern section of Honshu Island; they have come close to the shore in the areas of Kamaishi, Muroran, and Mito and have shelled them in a naval bombardment; we have heard that their carrier-based planes have been menacing traffic between the mainland and Hokkaido and have sunk a great number of ships. Our defensive measures, according to enemy broadcasts, have been next to nothing, even with our Navy and Air Force. This is most regrettable, but it may also be taken as the truth in the matter of how weak our war potential has become. If this trend continues, with every passing day the enemy fleet should be more able to move at will, as though it were unopposed. Actually, the names of the ships comprising the task force and even the name of the task force commander have already been ostentatiously broadcast, hurling an open challenge to the Japanese Navy.

2. On the other hand, the enemy air forces based in areas such as the Marianas, Okinawa and Iwo, attack various parts of Japan almost continuously. Large metropolitan areas have already been destroyed and the bombings have even reached out to the small and intermediate-sized cities, quite aside from arms-production facilities and oil-storage dumps. The successive destruction and conflagration of our cities continue. Moreover, just as our anti-aircraft defenses have manifestly decreased in their effectiveness in comparison with the days when the B-29's first started their attacks, so have we also had the command of the skies wrested from our grasp. We cannot assess this any other way.

3. Once the command of the skies has been taken from us by the enemy, our fighting strength will decline at an accelerated rate. This is quite clear if you look at Germany's example. Furthermore, once you have relinquished the mastery of the skies to the enemy it is well nigh impossible to regain it without outside assistance. For the Empire there is no hope other than that of mass production of aircraft in Manchuria. This development is quite recent and it is not only difficult to be sure just how much to expect from Manchurian production but also Manchuria itself is about to become a victim of mass bombing from nearby Okinawa.

4. Although I cannot know with certainty whether there is going to be an enemy landing on the mainland, I do not have sufficient faith to declare such a thing impossible, and I believe that we should be prepared for a landing, considering the thorough manner of the landing tactics in the enemy's Leyte operations, although there may be some differences because of geographic conditions. Furthermore, assuming that a date for the landings has been set, it is equally clear that this would be after our fighting strength has been completely destroyed.

In order to knock out our fighting strength, the enemy will pay special attention to depriving the people of the means of their livelihood, besides directly destroying military installations and industrial plants and bombing the cities. The enemy must know about our food shortage. They must also have a thorough knowledge of how great an influence the present autumn harvest will have on our fighting strength; and so plans on their part to destroy our crops should not be considered impossible with the coming of harvest time. For instance, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the enemy will ascertain the period when the paddies are dry and the rice-plants are ripe throughout the nation and devise methods of burning these up at one stroke. As far as they are concerned, it is a weakness of ours which they should only naturally exploit.

If we lose our autumn harvest, our situation will be absolutely critical and we will be in no position to continue the war. Our empire, which has already lost command of the skies, can do nothing to combat the above circumstances; we are at the mercy of the enemy and committed to whatever the enemy should will.

5. As I have already urged in my telegram No. 1143[2#Shusen shiroku, p. 466], continuing the war after our fighting strength has been destroyed should be considered impossible. It goes without saying that the Imperial Army and the populace as a whole will not surrender to the enemy as long as there is no Imperial command to do so; they will literally not throw away their spears until the last man. But even if the officers and men and the entire citizenry, who already have been deprived of their fighting ability by the absolute superiority of the enemy's bombing and gunfire, were to fight to the death, the state would not be saved. Do you think that the Emperor's safety can be secured by the sacrifice of seventy million citizens?

With the above thought in mind, I have come to the conclusion that the individual's position, the honor of the military, and the pride of the people cannot take the place of the state, and that there is no other way for us than to hurry and make up our minds to advocate peace.

6. I had been thinking that the peace proposal through the special envoy mentioned in your telegram No. 893[3#582], which was to be put forward in Moscow, was most right and proper. The dispatch of the special envoy however, unfortunately met with disapproval from the Soviet side (my telegram No. 1417[4#1226]), making it necessary to contrive some other way.

Once peace has been decided upon, although it may be difficult to avoid some harsh conditions which the Japanese citizens must endure as a result, we should be prepared for such an eventuality and have our military representatives and theirs conclude an agreement to terminate hostilities within the shortest possible time; we should put a stop to further sacrifices.

One of the conditions for peace that will require reservation and emphasis on our part is the matter of protecting our national polity. This will have to be for us an absolute requirement, and the fact that it will require us to make a strong impression on our opponents to this effect has already been stated in my telegram No. 1416[5#1225]. Regarding this matter of protecting the national polity, one way is to consider the matter one of a domestic nature and therefore excluded from the terms of a peace treaty. In this case, however, even though it may be but a formality, it will be necessary to hold something like a constitutional convention to hear the people's voice for the sake of appearances. And it cannot be expected that there will be no open opposition to the maintenance of the national polity from some extreme leftists at such a convention. Again, convening a constitutional convention may itself run counter to our Constitution; and if we are to cope with emergency circumstances, it will be necessary to find appropriate solutions regarding such criticisms of unconstitutionality.

On the other had, we may be able to solve the problem of our fundamental form of government with this formality and it may even be relatively easy to get the enemy's agreement, but I find this difficult to judge. In fact, if we resolve to have the Imperial Household above us under the general will of the people, our national polity might, indeed, carry a great deal of weight throughout the world.

7. What I mean to say as a peace proposal is to approve most of the enemy's conditions with the exception of the protection of the fundamental character of our form of government. As long as the fundamental character of our government is preserved, it would mean that our country's honor and existence will be guaranteed in the minimum degree, and I trust this will not run counter to the purport of your telegram No. 913-2[6#1224 p2] (please refer to my telegram No. 1416).

8. Our country is literally standing at the crossroads of destiny. If we were to continue the war under the present circumstances the citizens would die with the satisfaction of having truly served their country loyally and patriotically, but the country itself would be on the verge of ruin. Although it is possible to remain loyal to the great and just aims of the Greater East Asia War to the very end, it is meaningless to insist on them to the extent of destroying the state. We should protect the survival of our country even by enduring every kind of sacrifice.

Since the Manchurian incident Japan has pursued a policy of authoritarian rule. In the Greater East Asia War she finally plunged into a war beyond her means. As a result, we are confronted with the danger of having even our mainland trampled upon. Since there is no longer any real chance of success, I believe that it is the duty of the statesmen to save the nation by coming quickly to a decision to lay down our arms. If we seek peace, of course, we know roughly what the terms will be by observing the example of Germany. It is inevitable that the people will have to endure the heavy pressure of the enemy for a long period of time, but the nation will live on and we may be able to recover our former prosperity again after several decades. The government should certainly select this path. I ceaselessly implore that we put His Majesty's mind at ease without any delay whatever.

In the postwar dawn we must strive to carry out thoroughgoing reforms throughout the country, to democratize politics in general, and to do away with the domineering and self-righteous attitude of the bureaucrats in order to realize a truly harmonious relation between the Emperor and the people. The scorn for diplomacy and the indifference to international relations, even before the Manchurian incident, were the cause which brought about our present misfortune. In view of the fact that we shall encounter problems in finding a way out of our difficulties while being buffeted about by the storm of international relations in the postwar period, we recognize the urgency of adopting the best political system which will attach importance to future foreign relations.

Since entering into the anti-Comintern pact[7] our foreign policy has been completely bankrupt. The whole thing had its inception in our splitting the world into an Axis force and an anti-Axis force by joining forces with Nazism. For the future, we must clearly recognize our past mistakes and fundamentally reconstruct our foreign policy.

9. In obedience to the Imperial proclamation of war, It was the bounden duty of all the people to devote every effort to the achievement of the war objectives. Therefore I also endeavored to contribute my humble efforts to this cause. In view of the present situation, however, I consider it necessary to recognize frankly that the prospects in the present war have become desperate. The theory that we should counterattack with all our strength, if the United States and England should land on our mainland, and thus make them tire of the invasion should be carefully evaluated. I might have had some faith in the firm belief of the military and the government that our war potential can still inflict quite a blow on the enemy (your telegram No. 913-2) and I might have placed some hope in this if we had not yet lost control of the skies and of the sea. Today, however, we find ourselves in a situation in which we cannot repel the daily attacks of the enemy naval and air forces and in which our production facilities are continuously being destroyed. Moreover, we must consider that this situation will become rapidly even worse as time passes. The resulting imbalance of the opposing forces cannot be rectified no matter how heroically our soldiers and people fight. It also goes without saying that groups such as organized guerillas cannot accomplish much in the face of modern weapons. Thus, after an enemy landing on our mainland, there would be a struggle for every inch of land and repeated valiant fighting until we became exhausted and finally laid down our arms. By that time, as can be seen in the case of Germany, the entire country would already have been trampled by the enemy and the national sovereignty would have been transferred to an occupying power.

I only pray that we may quickly terminate the present situation, in which we can no longer hope to achieve our future objectives and in which we continue to resist simply from past inertia, and that we may save hundreds of thousands of lives which would be uselessly sacrificed and thereby stop short of the destruction of the nation, save our 70,000,000 people from misery, and endeavor to maintain the survival of our race.

I realize that it is a great crime to dare to make such statements, knowing that they are contrary to the views of the government. [Significantly different from text in Jul 22 Magic DS!] The reason for doing so, however, is that I believe that the only policy for national salvation must coincide with these ideas. Therefore, even though I am criticized as being a defeatist and am asked to take the responsibility of submitting to this criticism, I assert that I must willingly accept the responsibility.

Thus I was able to express my views freely, and I need not repeat them further. I beg that you understand that the motive which prompts me to say these thing is my sincere concern for the country. I cannot cease praying that my words, because of too much concern, may not result in unfounded and distorted views.

[1]Document No. 1224.
[2]Not printed herein. See Shusen shiroku, p. 466.
[3]Document No. 582, printed in vol I.
[4]Document No. 1226.
[5]Document No. 1225.
[6]i.e., paragraph 2 of document No. 1224.
[7]i.e., the German-Japanese agreement signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936. Text in Foreign Relations, 1936, vol I, p.400. Cf. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p153.

No. 1231
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 21, 1945--5 p.m.
VERY URGENT

1433. Re my telegram No. 1418[1#1227].

It is presumed that there is no connection between the rumored peace proposals in your telegram No. 919[2#not printed] and my telegram No. 1422[2#not printed] and the question of sending a special envoy. However, the Big Three Conference had already started on the 17th. Therefore, it may be presumed that the reply from the Soviet Union on the evening of the 18th mentioned in my previous telegram No. 1417[3#1226] may have stemmed from the Big Three Conference. If not, it must be taken into consideration that we had proposed sending a special envoy prior to the Big Three Conference and that this matter may have been divulged to the Anglo-American group.

Very little information on that conference is available from radio or other sources. In spite of the paucity of information thereon, it appears that the conference atmosphere is very friendly and that the three leaders are having frequent private meetings. Therefore, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union may take an unforeseeable turn. I am convinced of the necessity for extreme caution.

[1]Documment No. 1227.
[2]Not printed.
[3]Documment No. 1226.

No. 1232
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 24, 1945--5:56 p.m.
URGENT

1441. Re your telegram No. 932[1#1230].

We received this telegram on the 22d, but your telegram No. 931[2#1229] did not arrive until today, the 24th. After considering the manner of presenting our proposal, we intend to suggest a meeting with Lozovsky.

[1]Documment No. 1230.
[2]Documment No. 1229.

No. 1234
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)[1#below]
[Translation]
Moscow, July 25, 1945--11:23 p.m.
URGENT

1450. Re my telegram No. 1449[2#1235].

At the time of my conference with Lozovsky on the 25th, I stated orally as follows (as indicated at the beginning of my telegram,[3#1449] the above was to be sent later to L. in written form:)

1. At the meeting with you, the Acting People's Commissar, last July 13th, I delivered the message from the Emperor and also particularly mentioned His Majesty's desire to dispatch Prince Konoye.[4#586] Concerning the above, I received a reply from you in writing on the night of the 18th to the effect that the Government of the USSR could not give a specific answer because there was nothing concrete either in the message of the Emperor or in the Prince's mission to Moscow.[5#1226]

2. Concerning these matters, I once again made my proposal to you today to make the circumstances clear in the following manner:

The mission of special envoy Konoye, entrusted with the Emperor's request, is to ask the Government of the USSR to assist in the termination of the war and to explain our concrete intentions on this matter; his mission is at the same time to negotiate on matters which will solidify and improve relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become the basis of our diplomacy for the period during and after the war.

3. In addition to stating the foregoing on instructions from our Government to the Government of the USSR, I repeated that the Emperor especially ordered the Government to dispatch the envoy as a result of His Majesty's wishes to put an end to the tragedy of additional bloodshed from the continued exchange of fire. The special envoy will explain to the Government of the USSR the concrete intentions of the Japanese relative to the above, and will request its consideration of this matter. Therefore, I hope that the Government of the USSR will give sufficient and favorable consideration to this matter of the envoy and agree to the dispatch of the envoy very soon.

Furthermore, since the Government of the USSR is well aware that ex-Premier Prince Konoye enjoys high trust in the Imperial Court and is prominent in Japanese political circles, I believe it will not be necessary to add my own explanation here.

[1]The statement queoted in this message is presumably the communication read by the Soviet interpreter at the Tenth Plenary Meeting, July 28. See ante, p.460.
[2]Documment No. 1235.
[3]i.e., in telegram No. 1449.
[4]See vol. I, document No. 586.
[5]See documment No. 1226.

No. 1235
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow July 25, 1945--11:53 p.m.
URGENT

1449. Re my telegram No. 1441[1#1232].

On the 25th I met Lozovsky in order to make the proposal contained in my telegram No. 1450,[2#1234] and we continued our conversation as follows:

SATO: As you have already understood from my proposal, the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in a friendly manner relative to the termination of the war, and at the same time will have Prince Konoye explain directly to you the concrete intentions of our Government.

L: Could you give me the text of the proposal which you have just made? Its content is really important. If you could prepare a written text for me, I should be able to understand it more correctly. It is difficult to expect real accuracy from an oral presentation. It would also be convenient for me to make a report to my Government if I have a written text.

I should like to ask one or two questions: (1) I understand that the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in order to terminate the war, and (2) concerning the above problem Prince Konoye is going to bring us some concrete proposals. Now, are these concrete proposals for the termination of the war or for strengthening Russo-Japanese relations? As this point was not made clear, I should like to have you explain it to me so that I can make a report to my Government.

SATO: As to your latter question, the concrete intentions which Prince Konoye is going to explain to the Soviet Government are, as I understand it, concerned with both of the problems you have just mentioned. In other words, I understand that they are concerned, first, with the request to the Soviet Government for mediation and, second, with the problem of strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. As to your first request, it is outside the instructions which I have received to prepare a written text of the proposal which I made today. However, I shall prepare such a text for your reference on my own initiative and present it to you later, since the problem itself is significant, as you have suggested, and also in due consideration of the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin. Needless to say, however, I have to ask you to treat this text as top secret, because of its extremely secret nature. I should also like to mention that Prince Konoye, whose mission I have just explained to you, has our Emperor's greatest confidence and occupies an eminent position in our Government. Therefore, in my opinion, his mission will cover a vast area: he will ask the Soviet Government for mediation; and at the same time he will exchange views concerning problems common to both countries. Moreover, he may go into the problem of future relations between the two nations. I believe you will not be wrong in understanding the matter as I have indicated above.

L: I understand well the secret nature of this problem; I also understand well that what you have conveyed to me, Mr. Ambassador, is very confidential. I will make a report to my Government as soon as I receive your written text. Moreover, I will let you know immediately concerning any instructions I receive from my Government.

SATO: Thank you for your kind help. I personally would also wish to hear from you as soon as possible.

Before leaving, I added the following:

The intention of the Japanese Government, regarding Prince Konoye's mission, is to ask the Soviet Government's assistance in terminating the war. I am sure that the intention is good. Therefore, it is my hope that you will be able to make arrangements so that the Soviet Government will have an opportunity to hear directly from the Prince on this matter.

This would have ended today's meeting. However, I repeated my own explanation of the mission of the special envoy, which appeared to impress L. a great deal. Particularly the fact that our Government has asked the Soviet Government to mediate seemed to arrest his attention. L. listened to our proposal with an earnest and attentive attitude throughout, and promised me an answer from his Government.

[1]Documment No. 1232.
[2]Documment No. 1234.

Transcriber's Note: Documents Nos. 1236 through 1255 are U.S. government documents relating to the drafting of the Potsdam Declaration.

No. 1236 [Stimson July 16 memo to Truman suggesting a warning to Japan]
No. 1237 [Hull communication to Byrnes via Grew regarding Declaration wording]
No. 1238 [memorandum of telephoned response by Byrnes to document No. 1237]
No. 1239 [July 18 message from Joint Chiefs of Staff (Leahy) to Truman recommending replacement of "... may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty ..." with "... the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government ..."
No. 1240 [Grew to Byrnes proposing wording to be used in reply to press conference questions concerning rumors of government intent to clarify or modify position regarding unconditional surrender]
No. 1241 [Stimson memo to Truman regarding details of Declaration wording]
No. 1242 [Byrnes' reply to Grew's message of document No. 1240]
No. 1243 [Grew July 22 memo to Byrnes describing content of Captain Zacharias' July 21 evening Japanese-language radio broadcast clarifying meaning of "unconditional surrender", and US press reactions to same]
No. 1244 [Draft of Potsdam Declaration]
No. 1245 [British suggestions for ammendments to Potsdam Declaration draft]
No. 1246, 1247, 1248 [communications with Chinese government regarding Potsdam Declaration]
No. 1249 [Churchill approval of Potsdam Declaration]
No. 1250, 1251, and 1252 [communications with Chinese government regarding Potsdam Declaration]

No. 1253 [notification from Byrnes to Molotov of release of Potsdam Declaration for issuance next morning]

No. 1254 [US State Department comments on Potsdam Declaration wording--important background.]

No. 1255 [memo regarding mechanics of Potsdam Declaration publication]

No. 1256
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)[1#]
[Translation]
Moscow, July 27, 1945--4:30 p.m.
SECRET
URGENT

1458. Re my telegram No. 1449.[2#1235]

Although it is difficult to predict what the Soviet reply will be to our recent request,[3#1234/#1235] it is possible that the repeated request by the Japanese Government is regarded as merely seeking the good offices of the Government of the Soviet Union, since we failed to indicate on what basis such a request was made. Since the request does not even indicate an outline, the Soviet Union may find it impossible to decide its attitude so simply on such an important matter, and it is conceivable that the request may be turned down again. If, by chance, it does result in a Soviet refusal, I am deeply concerned lest this may force us into a very awkward position. It may also implicate the Imperial Household, since we have been ordered by the Emperor to end further bloodshed and are strongly urged to send a special envoy

In presenting the request, as directed in your telegram No. 931[4#1229] regarding the mission of Prince Konoye, I have taken precaution not to give the impression that the mission is to set forth the Japanese Government's "concrete aim", and not to present a concrete "proposal". Lozovsky, however, stated that he understood ...[5#garble in original] is to bring a "concrete proposal" and, as he hinted that he was expecting some form of concrete proposition, I believe we must pay special attention to this point.

In presenting a proposal to end such a tremendous undertaking as the present large-scale war, we do not, in the final analysis, have a definite proposition but are only explaining our intention in a indirect way. It is absolutely impossible to cause the Soviet Government to make a move with such a noncommittal attitude on our part. In this connection I do not have the slightest doubt that the straight-forward attitude of the Soviet Union is designed to compel Japan to come out with a concrete proposal.

The definitive joint declaration against Japan made by the leaders of the three nations--the United States, Great Britain, and China--at Potsdam on the 26th[6#1382] appears to be a big scare-bomb directed against us. It became very doubtful whether the Soviet Union would offer its good offices under this offensive started by the three countries. Then there is no doubt that the aforesaid tripartite declaration is a counteroffensive, with our trial venture to terminate the war as its target. According to a broadcast of the B.B.C. on the 26th, Lord [Louis] Mountbatten visited Potsdam on his return trip to England and is said to have reported to and consulted with the Big Three leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union on the progress of the war in the Far East.[7#] We must take note of the remark that Stalin has for the first time participated in a discussion of the war in the Far East. For your information I make this reference, since this is also a matter which I fear may have some affect on the attitude of the Soviet Union in relation to our request for the Soviets' good offices.

[1 See Vol I, p.873 for a note conerning (a) the extent to which the contents of the papers of Japanese origin printed in this section were known to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg and (b) the translations here printed.] [7 See ante, pp.375-378, 381.]

No. 1259
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 28, 1945--3:25 p.m.
SECRET
URGENT

1476. Re your telegram No. 944.[1#1233]

1. Your above telegram (repeat telegram[2#] received on the 28th and decoding completed) and my telegrams numbered 1449, 1450, and 1458[3#1235/#1234/#1256] crossed each other on the way. In the meantime Attlee, the newly appointed Prime Minister, returned to Potsdam on the same day and is reported to have joined the conference immediately. Thus, item No. 1 of your telegram is now out of the question. Even if we did make a request, there is no possibility that the Soviet side would agree to my visit, which would only result in exposing our uneasy emotion and would be of no benefit to us.

2. Item No. 2 of your telegram stated that a request will first be made to the Soviet Union for its good offices, and, should the Soviet Government react coldly, that there is no other choice but to consider some other course or method. Praising or criticizing the Soviet Union will be regarded by them as being done to suit our convenience, and in view of the various circumstances the attitude mentioned above appears to lack applicability.

3. According to item No. 3 of your telegram a United States spokesman has hinted that unconditional surrender still stands; however, should Japan accept surrender immediately, in reality the terms may be mollified. What the spokesman said is only natural and after considering these circumstances I presented my opinion in telegram No. 1427.[4#1228]

I have no way of knowing the extent of the authority given to Captain Zacharias in his broadcast. His word, however, that Japan shall receive the benefit of the Atlantic Charter is in contradiction to the attitude taken by England and the United States when they rejected German participation under the said Charter prior to her surrender. Also, I find no reason why such attitude will be relaxed for present-day Japan when the same was not done at that time. Also, according to your opinion, you are not opposed to the restoration of peace based on the said Charter. Can this be interpreted to mean that the Imperial Government has already accepted demilitarization? Then, if this is the case, the question is, why did Japan not notify the Soviet Government of acceptance of demilitarization when Japan first asked to send the special envoy? In the same way, the question will arise regarding prior recognition of the independence for Korea.

4. Although the B.B.C. announced that the Prime Minister made a statement[5#1258] to the effect that the Japanese Government will "ignore" the July 26 tripartite declaration against Japan,[6#1382] we have not received any official telegram to this effect. Also, regardless of whether it is intended to ignore the above declaration, it was not reported through general information media. The tripartite declaration is an official expression of their will and not only does it supersede the above-mentioned statement of Captain Zacharias but in reality there is some difference on important points. (According to this declaration, it is interpreted that Japan's territory shall be limited to Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido, and the United States will reserve the right to occupy Okinawa even though the declaration did not substantiate this.)

5. Your telegram No. 893[7#582] mentioned sending the special envoy only. Telegram No. 931[8#1229] clearly indicates seeking the good offices of the Soviet Government. Also, in your telegram No. 944, you have asked me to make it clear that the dispatch of the special envoy to the Soviet Union is to enable Stalin to acquire the position of advocate of world peace. This, to our sorrow, gives the impression that we are giving out our aims piecemeal. With regard to our comment that you have considered the possibility that the Soviet side might react coldly toward our request and that Japan may have to consider other ways and means, I feel embarrassed, since I am unable to understand what was meant by "other ways and means".

6. All things considered, as mentioned in my telegram No. 1450, I am awaiting a reply from the Soviet side. If there is no reply all day on the 30th (Monday), I am inclined to press for a reply immediately.

7. Shortly after this telegram was drafted your telegram No. 952[9#1257] arrived. With reference to the third item, please understand that the meeting with Molotov will [not?] take place as mentioned in the first item of this telegram unless a special, concrete, and definite proposal for termination of the war is presented by the Imperial Government of Japan.

No. 1260
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 30, 1945--8 p.m.
SECRET
URGENT

1480. Re your telegram No. 952.[1#1257]

1. There is no reason to believe that Stalin was not informed beforehand on the Potsdam joint declaration[2#1382] and this must be considered only natural, judging from the present relationship among the three countries--the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Also, for the most part, we can surmise that the above-mentioned joint declaration had some connection with our plan to send the special envoy, i.e., our first request to the Soviet Union on the 13th regarding the dispatch of a special envoy.[3#586] It can be suspected that the subject was casually mentioned to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain at Potsdam.[4#] I believe we can conclude that the recent joint declaration was based on this information and that the three countries--the United States, Great Britain and China--made a proclamation in an effort to make their stand clear and definite. As to whether or not the declaration of the 26th was made after the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were informed [5#] of the first request which I made to Lozovsky on the 25th and also regarding the second request [6#1234/#1235] (my telegram No. 1449[7#1235]) on sending the special envoy, all this is not actually too important. Also, in reality, we believe that a discussion was held with Chiang Kai-shek prior to our presentation of the request on the 25th. Nevertheless, it is possible that they have already ferreted out signs of our overtures to conclude a negotiated peace at that time. The only ones who know the circumstances of that period are Stalin and Molotov, and it is a difficult task to find out the truth. As for our side, I believe there is nothing we can do but to reason as indicated above.

2. In connection with the above problems, one important point is that by issuing the joint declaration, the United States and Great Britain made persistent demands on Japan to surrender unconditionally immediately, and another important point which they made clear is that they have no intention of relaxing the terms as stated in the declaration. If Stalin sees that it is impossible to shake the will of the United States and Great Britain regarding the above points, it would mean that our request to send the special envoy cannot be accepted and will be futile, regardless of how we explain that our desire to terminate the miserable war is in accordance with the will of our gracious Emperor and that Stalin will be called the advocate of world peace, etc. As for the United States and Great Britain, their contention will be that the only way for Japan to avoid the bloodshed of war is to surrender immediately. Stalin will also exert sufficient heavy pressure on the United States, Great Britain, and China regarding Manchuria, China, Korea, etc., in the event that Japan surrenders. He is also believed to have made up his mind to push through his claim and actually holds the power to do so. Therefore I believe that Stalin feels there is absolutely no necessity for making a voluntary agreement with Japan. On this point I see a serious discrepancy between your view and the actual state of affairs.

Also, attention should be paid to Australian foreign Minister Evatt's announcement, as reported by the B.B.C. on the 30th, that he was opposed to the attitude of the joint declaration against Japan since it tends to be more lenient toward Japan that the stand taken by the Allied nations against Germany in the past.[8#]

I request that you read through telegram No. 1476[9#1259] together with this telegram.

[4 ....]
[5 ....]

No. 1261
761.94/7-2145:Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)
[Translation]
Moscow, July 30, 1945--10:31 p.m.
SECRET
URGENT

1484. Re my telegram No. 1476,[1#1259] item 6.

Worried by the delay in reply from the Soviet side, I met with Lozovsky on the 30th at 5 p.m. and again conveyed our wishes. The following conversation took place:

SATO: I have come to receive your reply concerning our request for assistance by the Government of the Soviet Union to end the war which was presented to your Government on the 25th.[2#1234/#1235] Although it was arranged that we should be notified as soon as the reply was ready, since it is now Monday I have come to inquire about your reply.

LOZOVSKY: Since both Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, are now in Berlin, the reply will necessarily take several days to arrive. I regret to say that the reply cannot be delivered yet.[3#]

SATO: I fully understand the circumstances. However, the three countries--Great Britain, the United States, and China--issued a joint declaration against Japan on the 26th, pressing unconditional surrender on Japan. Unconditional surrender is, after all, out of the question for the Japanese Government. Our view remains the same as was stated on the 13th, at our meeting before that last. If it is possible to avoid such a formula, however, Japan desires to end the war, with an extremely conciliatory attitude, so long as Japan is guaranteed the nation's honor and existence. For this purpose we asked the Soviet Government for assistance. I hope that Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, will give special consideration to this point. Although it has not been possible to receive your reply, I shall be happy if you will notify Commissar Molotov that I have come to see the Acting People's Commissar in order to receive the reply.

LOZOVSKY: I shall do my best to convey Your Excellency's request to Molotov today by all means.

SATO: I shall be much obliged if you will kindly do so. The Japanese Government has decided to send the Emperor's most trusted Prince Konoye as special envoy to Moscow. As I explained at previous meetings, the envoy will discuss a wide range of subjects as to how the Japanese Government should work to re-establish peace in the Far East and will seek your Government's assistance. I shall also appreciate it if you will inform Mr. Molotov that my understanding is that Prince Konoye will be empowered to discuss a wide range of subjects with the Soviet Government. Also, the Japanese Government understands that various reservations and stipulations will be made by the Soviet Union in connection with the Japanese Government's request for assistance.

LOZOVSKY: I shall arrange as you request immediately.

SATO: The point which I am concerned about is the possibility that the tripartite joint declaration may obstruct the assistance from the Soviet Government which is desired by the Japanese Government. However, since the top leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin, I hope that they will give appropriate consideration to the removal of such obstructions.

LOZOVSKY: I promise again to convey your request.

[3 ...]